Hamas: Poised for Power and Peace?

When Hamas garnered a majority in the Palestinian Authority's (PA) 2006 parliamentary elections, its victory didn't enjoy the sort of dual apprehension and excitement that the Muslim Brotherhood did when the latter ascended to Egypt's leadership following Mubarak's fall. Hamas' rise, backed by popular support in Gaza with some appeal in the West Bank, was perceived by the governments of the United States, Europe and especially Israel, as nothing short of a terrorist organization gaining popular legitimacy. The election results prompted Hamas and Fatah to fight for consolidation of power in Gaza, but only after an attempt to form a national unity government fell though. Israel's response to the elections first included economic sanctions followed by a full-scale invasion of the Strip in 2008/2009, using rockets fired into Israel as a pretext. Despite incurring disproportionate casualties compared to Israel and crippling economic sanctions, Gaza has remained under Hamas control, to Israel's amazement and dismay. These developments, coupled with the momentum of the Arab uprisings, shifting regional alliances in response to the carnage in Syria and President Obama's hopeless pursuit of a 'liberal peace' that leaves no room for Hamas in the negotiations, have thrust Hamas forward as a force not easily marginalized and one that which must be acknowledged.

Political cartoon from Your Democracy

In Gaza, popular support for Hamas has waned in recent years. The momentum it had leading up to the 2006 elections was blunted by failed reconciliation efforts between Hamas and Fatah, the two dominant parties in the PA. And although Hamas has renounced violence in its political agenda, deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions and marginalization in the peace process have on occasion led Hamas to rescind their peaceful pledge. The majority of violence against Israel from Gaza, however, does not originate from Hamas but from militant Islamist groups hoping to exploit tensions for their own ideological gain. For example, just this summer violence resumed between Israel and Gaza despite an overall successful cease-fire agreement. Militant groups, such as the Islamic Jihad, operate in Gaza and are often cited as those responsible for the violence, not Hamas. It would be intuitive to think that since Hamas enjoys control over Gaza, it is responsible for monitoring the cease-fire within its jurisdiction. This becomes less true, however, when one considers the desperation and squalor that Gazans experience as a result of an imposed humanitarian disaster that includes the destruction of Gaza's critical infrastructure by Israeli forces. Trade restrictions have crippled the Gazan economy, driving up unemployment and poverty while virtually eliminating the private sector. Currently, the majority of Gaza's population is completely reliant on humanitarian assistance and live in constant fear. Such living conditions radicalize the population, creating widespread sympathy for the plight of the Palestinian people in Gaza. Some would interpret this as tacitly accepting violence against Israel. This paradigm is self-reinforcing and exacerbated by Israeli assassinations, bombing of infrastructure, trade sanctions and blockade.

Despite the enormous obstacles, there is room for hope. For one, Hamas has refrained from taking sides in the Syrian conflict, enraging its longtime allies in Damascus. This, coupled with deteriorating security conditions along the Gazan-Egyptian border, have prompted Hamas to relocate its 'outside' leadership from Damascus to Cairo in a dual effort to shift its regional alliance and to maintain security, both positive developments. Resumption of relations between Egypt and Hamas comes as a welcome end to Hamas' diplomatic isolation, especially considering Egypt's strategic importance to the United States. Before the Arab uprisings, the US-backed authoritarian regime in Egypt was advised, with the allure of arms sales, to sever ties with Hamas and to close its border with Gaza. Since the uprisings, we've seen a reversal in Egyptian policy largely attributed to the fact that Hamas is an offshoot (and was formed by members) of the Muslim Brotherhood. And in response to the uprisings, stability has become everyone's top priority, which will have to include Hamas' cooperation and therefore its engagement.

As evidenced by Hamas' refrain from supporting the Asad regime, realignment with Egypt and mostly successful cease-fire with Israel, Hamas has proved to be a dynamic organization. It has shown time and time again that when the political opportunity presents itself, Hamas rises to the occasion. Taking advantage of cease-fire deals with Israel and improving (and severing) diplomatic relations, however, comes with a political price. Since Hamas' performance in the 2006 parliamentary elections, it has disavowed violence in its political agenda. In turn, Hamas' militant factions have broken with their parent organization, rejecting the possibility of peace with Israel. These developments have made it particularly hard for Hamas to consolidate power and monitor cease-fire agreements and have given Israel the pretext for further military operations in Gaza. A long-term cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas will need to call for intelligence coordination between the two parties. Israel will also need to abandon the idea that the radical Islamic groups that operate in Gaza and the Sinai are not monolithic but in fact have different ideological, political and strategic agendas. This can be done, and the current political climate reinforces this potential.

An unexpected determinant in Hamas' influence in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will be President Obama's reelection. President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu's rapport soured in 2010-11 after peace efforts collapsed. Obama's negotiations with Netanyahu failed for many reasons, chief of which were the precedents the terms of the agreement would set and the resulting race to get the diplomatic upper-hand. Not surprisingly, Netanyahu courted Governor Romney on his trip to Israel and has lobbied hard to appeal to American Jewish voters for support, to Obama's displeasure. The two have butted heads since the beginning, but the tables have turned now that President Obama has been reelected. Because of his rocky history with Netanyahu and his antics, and with the hope that Obama has learned from his failures, the latter will now have the diplomatic ante to ratchet up the pressure on his Israeli counterpart. This will ultimately lead to less promises for Israel, which will force Netanyahu to reevaluate his concessions. If Hamas can signal to both parties at the right time, it may find an unexpected diplomatic opening. Including Hamas in some sort of peace agreement or (more likely) cease-fire could give Hamas' decisions more influence in the PA or at least sprout the possibility that despite its designation as a terrorist organization, Hamas can be a party to negotiations even if it isn't considered the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.'

Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani (C-R) walks alongside Gaza's Hamas 

prime minister Ismail Haniyeh (C-L) during a welcome ceremony at the Rafah 

border crossing with Egypt on October 23, 2012 in the Gaza Strip. 

(MOHAMMED ABED/AFP/Getty Images)

(http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/israel-and-palestine/121023/qatar-emir-visits-gaza-hamas-leaders-d)

Although Hamas' new posture has resuscitated internal divisions over the appropriate direction for the organization and its stance toward a unity agreement with Fatah, the Arab uprisings have put wind in Hamas' sails. Regional alliances are shifting away from a Western-brokered status quo in favor of popular sentiment, leading Hamas to recalibrate its approach to Palestinian reconciliation with regard to the West Bank. Indeed, Hamas also enjoys political and economic support from the Qatari emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who, on his recent trip to Gaza, pledged $400 million for infrastructural projects while also pushing for Hamas-Fatah reconciliation. Even Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan plans to visit Gaza soon. Thus, there is a political and diplomatic opening coming to the fore, and it will be up to pragmatic policymakers to embrace the changes in the Middle East with an eye toward Hamas' inclusion.

(For anyone who is interested, the International Crisis Group has an excellent report outlining the challenges and opportunities Hamas faces since the Arab uprisings in 2011)

(Updated 11-6-12 to provide clarity in the introductory paragraph and to include the implications of Obama's reelection on Hamas' political engagements in the Middle East. I've included an extra paragraph of analysis on an American-led peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.)

The Case for Turkey’s Accession Into the E.U.

A few months ago, I wrote an article explaining why I thought the European Union should disband. Given the fact that the euro continues to perform miserably against other currencies, member states continue to bicker over the best way to ameliorate economic woes, and citizens of those states worst off continue to violently protest new austerity measures, I still think disbanding may be necessary and inevitable. However, I am fully cognizant of the repercussions such a move would have not only on Europe, but also on the rest of the world. Such a bold and critical move may not be advisable in the short term, and for now it appears that the European Union is safe from my forecasted demise.

However, if this is the case, there are very few reasons why Turkey should continue to be shuttered from the European Union’s borders. Perhaps Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande and the other heads of state have more pressing matters to deliberate over these days, but the issue of Turkish accession should be given much more thought than it is at the moment.

Turkey has been seeking accession into the European Union since 1995 – almost two decades. Their application for E.U. membership has always been in contention for several reasons, primarily Turkey being a predominantly Muslim state. The European Union has its fair share of far-right anti-Muslim nations, but overall most of the member states have even subtle xenophobic tendencies. There is certainly no such thing as a Muslim member state thus far – Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have the current highest populations, which still only make up less than 10% of the overall European population.

The other elephant in the room is Turkey’s other neighbors – Iran, Iraq, and Syria – and the possible implications this could have on the European Union. The Schengen Agreement of 1985 established the “Schengen Area”, comprised of twenty-six of the European Union member states (excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland). The Schengen Area, under the agreement, has open borders, and citizens can move from state to state as easily as Americans can move from state to state within U.S. The European Union’s timidity when it comes to the Middle East and ongoing tensions there is evident in their reluctance to admit Turkey. This accession would effectively open up Turkey’s border with E.U. states to anyone entering Turkey – legally or illegally – and could result in increased terrorism, a significantly higher Muslim population and increased difficulty in keeping track of the spread of Middle Eastern turmoil. Especially now, given the situation in Syria, widespread exodus could spill over through Turkey into much of the rest of the European Union. The European Union, with their economic difficulties right now, can simply not accommodate such immediate and massive immigration, and would have a very hard time shutting their borders down.

These are, of course, two very real talking points between Turkey and the European Union members. At least until the unrest in Syria dissipates, the European Union will be extremely refractory when it comes to the topic of Turkish accession. On the other hand though, there are several reasons why accession would actually be beneficial to the E.U. Turkey may be a predominantly Muslim state, but it is also a bastion of democracy and can act as a role model for many of the other Muslim states not yet secularized. Turkey also has the fifteenth-largest economy in the world, at just under $800 billion in 2011. An economy that size would be a major asset to the floundering E.U. right now. Germany already recognizes this – they are Turkey’s largest trading partner, with the two trading approximately $40 billion in goods last year.

Finally, Turkey is one of the most crucial players in the current global political arena. Strategically speaking, their position in between the Middle East and Europe could be extremely advantageous as a buffer zone in the future. Not to mention Turkey’s military strength – they are the second largest contributor to NATO and a key military ally to both Europe and the U.S. Instead of expressing concern about Turkey’s open borders should they be admitted to the E.U., member states should be considering what may happen should they refuse Turkey accession: Turkey could very likely look towards the Middle East, China and Russia to strengthen ties with instead. With such a large economy and large military, tensions would exacerbate quickly if this were the case.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan

Take your time, E.U. I’m not suggesting this is a dire decision and needs to be made immediately. With the stakes so high in both the E.U. and the Middle East these days, it seems imprudent to continue pushing Turkey away. After recent negotiations, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said “No other country has been kept waiting, knocking on the door of the E.U., for such a long time.” The E.U. should not let Turkey’s eagerness for accession disappear, or they may have a lot more than an economic crisis to deal with in the upcoming years.

The 2012 Presidential Foreign Policy Debate: “War is bad and peace is good”

Last night’s foreign policy debate was, for me at least, the highlight of the election season. While domestic issues and the candidates’ positions on them are of course interesting and important, let’s face it: foreign policy is my jam. I was utterly disappointed when the “foreign policy” section of the previous, supposedly split-topic debate that consisted of a single question on the attack on the US consulate in Libya. Finally, I could look forward to a debate not only concerning the field I am most passionate about, but also focusing mainly on the region I know the best. Yet what the debate ended up revealing about both Pres. Obama and Gov. Romney was not their differences on foreign policy, but their almost mind-numbing similarities. While this may not make for the most entertaining debate (the “horses and bayonets” comment aside), it certainly gives me hope that the neo-conservative era of the Bush years is truly over regardless of which party sits in the White House.

A clear choice? Courtesy of the Huffington Post.

The first question fielded by the moderator was, naturally, about Benghazi. Although I certainly think that the attacks on Benghazi are central to the State Department’s security policy going forward, I do not necessarily agree with the amount of attention that has been paid to them during this election. Given that Libya as a whole remains a complex and urgent issue, to focus on the microcosm of the attacks will forward the agendas of those who wish to downgrade our relationship with the new Libyan government. I am all about having friends in a volatile region, and considering there was little the fledgling government could have done to better protect the consulate when our own State Dept. failed to do so, I don’t think we should be discounting Libya as a possible ally just yet.

Gov. Romney raised the usual alarmist bells about “terrorists of some kind” (Al Qaeda?) operating in “ten or twelve countries” including Northern Mali without pointing to how he would deal with such groups while avoiding military involvement abroad. Meanwhile, Pres. Obama insisted that it is “important to step back and think,” a hallmark of his pensive foreign policy over the last four years. Despite the more combative rhetoric employed by Mr. Romney, in substance the two men agreed on future policy: establish better security for our interests abroad, and project of an image of “American strength” to somehow thwart would-be attackers. The claim that such an image can actually do much to protect us in the face of extremists is a bit dubious, but both men agreed that they would try to employ it either way.

Romney hit on his regular talking points, suggesting that Obama had “projected weakness” during a presidency that saw an exponential rise in drone strikes, the death of bin Laden, and US military intervention in Libya. On Libya, Pres. Obama was quick to point out that he “took leadership in organizing an international coalition…at a cost of less than what we spent in two weeks in Iraq” in order to depose Qaddafi. Gov. Romney criticized this reliance on surgical missions such as drone strikes at first, saying that “we can’t kill our way out of this mess"- a statement that I agree with, but later in the debate, he seemed to go back on this point, agreeing with the President’s increase of the use of drone strikes.

On the topic of Syria, the candidates couldn’t find a difference to stand on. In fact, the most aggressive part of this portion came when the candidates tried to convince the world that they love Israel best. Gov. Romney stated he would identify “responsible parties” within the Syrian opposition and magically replace Bashar al-Asad with said parties, all without U.S. military involvement. Pres. Obama said essentially the same thing, and closed by saying “[Gov. Romney] doesn’t have different ideas and that’s because we’re doing exactly what we should be doing to try to promote a moderate Syria leadership.” Pointing out the obvious, neither candidate could find a way to distinguish their policies from that of their challenger.

Romney and Obama then talked about America’s role in the world, which I have more than a few qualms with. He claimed: “the mantle of leadership for promoting the principles of peace has fallen to America. We didn’t ask for it, but it is an honor for us to have it.” But we did ask for it, actually. The entire 20^th century of American interventionism is a case study in us “asking for it.” Pres. Obama also made a vague patriotic statement about our role in the world: “America remains the world’s one indispensible nation.” American exceptionalism clearly runs deep in both sides of the political spectrum.

Biggest disappointment of the debate: when asked the question of what they would do if Israel bombed Iran, both candidates refused to answer. Romney insisted “let’s not go into hypotheticals like that,” except going into “hypotheticals like that” is the Commander in Chief’s job. The American people deserve to know that if a US ally attacked a sovereign state without coordinating with the U.S., would we go to war to defend Israel in flagrant violation of international law? Would we give Iran the gift of siding with the Israelis and breed an entire generation of Muslims – Arabs and Persians alike – that despises America? These questions will not be answered during the course of this election and yet may pose the most dangerous concrete military threat to the United States. Pres. Obama's sidestepping of the issue did nothing to clarify what the US will do if Israel takes such an extreme step.

A difference in opinion finally came at the tail end of the debate. When asked what poses the biggest future threat to America, Obama said that it would “continue to be terrorist networks,” while Romney seemed to indicate China, although failed to make the allegation outright. According to Romney, “from day one, [he] will label [China] a currency manipulator.” The moderator quickly pointed out that this could, in fact, generate a trade war. Such an extreme action belies the complexity and inherent delicacy of the US-China relationship and would do much to unravel the mutually beneficial ties we have built over the last four decades. It would be naïve, foolish, and hurt the American people more than anyone else in the equation.

The debate was a far cry from a Rumble in the Jungle. The most memorable lines from either candidate were “horses and bayonets” from Obama and “I agree with the President” from Romney. They both were aggressive, but only towards each other. I feel as though I can breathe a little easier knowing that the Republican Party seems to have finally turned away from the disastrous foreign policies of the Bush era. Their domestic conservatism may have increased and swung to the extreme on some issues, but even Romney avoided admitting he would launch a pre-emptive strike on (for instance) Iran. Both men made the requisite vague statements, dumbing down foreign affairs to a level that could be understood by the majority of the American electorate, although I bet more than a few people were Googling Mali. I can only hope that in practice, their policies match the nuanced, complicated reality that is world politics and not the generalizations that sell so much better to their constituents. Otherwise, all we really learned is that both men don’t like war but definitely like peace, and I guess that is a sentiment both conservatives and liberals can take pride in sharing.

Are These Economic Sanctions Going to Backfire?

The New York Times this morning published an article describing new sanctions the E.U. has put in place on Iran, specifically related to trade in metals, finance, and natural gas. The sanctions are such that it is nearly impossible these days for Europeans to do business in any way with Iranians, effectively severing financial ties between the two entities. Surely, this will be another staggering blow dealt to the already floundering Iranian economy. Perhaps the amount of trade the European Union does with Iran is miniscule in comparison with the United States and other leading global powers; however, I applaud the E.U. for their most recent round of trade sanctions on Iran given their current dismal economic situation. That does not mean I approve of them, though.

The Western powers find themselves in a difficult situation when it comes to Iran these days, for several reasons. The never-ending train wreck that is Syria has added increased instability to what is normally a highly unstable region of the world – the United States and Europe must tread very carefully. Iran’s continued support of Assad has maybe drawn more ire from the Western world, but the overall relationship is so negative that this added irritation wouldn’t affect things much. When it comes to Iran itself, the nuclear debate continues to rage on, with neither side making much of an impact on the other. Personally, I do not believe Iran is as close to developing nuclear arms as many Republicans have asserted lately, but I do concede that it would be foolish to let Iran continue to do as they please. While Iran may be some ways away still from the 80% uranium enrichment they’ll need for nuclear weapons, my colleague Vicky has pointed out that as the process moves along, enrichment increases exponentially.

The potential solutions to this conundrum seem scarce, if not non-existent. Military action is absolutely out of the question – if we have abstained from such intervention in war-torn Syria for 18 months, we cannot justify invading a country that comparatively is highly stable. Even clandestine operations are extremely risky. Should the C.I.A. or any similar organization be caught in Iran, the repercussions from China and Russia would be painfully draconian. The situation is not yet dire enough to warrant such a risk.

Economic sanctions seem to be the last viable option. And so far, it seems that they have been extremely effective. Last month, Iran’s currency, the rial, lost 40% of its value against the dollar. Oil production is the lowest it has been since 1988, down dramatically from last year. And with the E.U.’s latest sanctions, things will only get worse for Iran.

Here’s the thing: the Iranian leadership doesn’t care. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continues to shrug off the sanctions to the media, and President Ahmadinejad seems only marginally more concerned. It is Iran’s middle class that is bearing the brunt of these sanctions, as jobs decrease, prices increase, and the currency continues to be undervalued. The sanctions are working because the U.S. and Europe wanted to put the Iranian government in the position of having to bail out their middle class from total economic chaos, but the problem is that so far the government seems to have spurned these people in lieu of their beloved nuclear program. Take about the all-time backfire.

Maybe the threshold has simply not yet been reached, and Iran will eventually throw in the towel and back off the nuclear program in order to save their middle class. I hope that is the case. But if they don’t, the U.S. will have an even bigger, and more immediate problem to deal with than nuclear weapons – an Iranian middle class that despises us even more than they used to, and the perfect economic environment for radicalism to thrive in. We need to ask ourselves: at what cost will we foster yet another country for al Qaeda and its affiliates to burrow in and strengthen? This is not to say al Qaeda and its affiliates are not already in Iran. But without a serious re-evaluation of the sanctions we are imposing, we may see their presence explode in the future. My fear is that that explosion will be just as bad as a nuclear bomb’s.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, part 1

Of all the human rights issues dealt with by the United Nations, arbitrary detention receives the least attention and yet leads to a plethora of other violations. The Commission on Human Rights (the Human Rights Council or HRC since 2006) created the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) in 1991 to deal with the growing tide of reports of arbitrary detention occurring worldwide. The phenomenon of arbitrary detention is nothing new; people have been detained by governments without legal basis or recourse since time immemorial. Yet the creation of international human rights laws in the 20^th century made arbitrary deprivation of freedom internationally illegal for the first time. Since the entry into force of the first binding agreements on detention, the illegality of arbitrary detention has crystallized into customary law, meaning that all states must respect it regardless of membership to any binding agreements. In practice, arbitrary detention not only continues to be a problem, it is becoming more widespread. 

UN headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland

The WGAD is mandated to “seek and receive information” on detention from various channels and follow-up on cases of detention found to be arbitrary with communications directly to governments. At the time of its inception, many observers were pleased and hopeful to see a UN Special Procedures body given such a dynamic mandate; until the WGAD no other Special Procedures had been given such an active power to not only receive complaints but also to investigate them. Yet since its establishment 20 years ago, the WGAD continues to have its mandate renewed and less than 50 percent of governments to whom it sends communications even bother to acknowledge their receipt. Due to problems of enforcement, types of detention, and organization the WGAD falls short of the high hopes that accompanied its creation. Nevertheless, it remains the only HRC body through which victims of arbitrary detention can at least seek recognition of their situation, if not true justice.

Arbitrary detention has been illegal in international law since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 specifically forbade it in article 9. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a legally binding document upon the parties (167 countries), also bans arbitrary arrest and detention in article 9(1). In the time since the creation of the first international agreements on the illegality of arbitrary detention, it has become accepted as customary international law. The WGAD was created to address the fact that despite the international laws and norms forbidding it, arbitrary detention persists worldwide regardless of the country concerned. Even developed countries such as the United States persist in their practice of arbitrary detention and illustrate the transcendent nature of the issue at hand: it occurs in every country, against every group, regardless of the state’s level of development, wealth, or education.

The WGAD falls under the umbrella of the United Nations HRC’s Special Procedures. It is one of 38 mechanisms that analyze and report on human rights situations either occurring in a specific country or falling under a thematic category. Special Procedures operate in different ways and have very different mandates: they can be chaired by either a single Special Rapporteur or a Working Group of independent experts and themes range from indigenous rights to the effects of foreign debt. Yet they are all international whistle-blowers on human rights violations and are some of the most accessible means through with individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can make claims of violations of internationally protected rights. 

In the current global system, this is extremely important as entities like NGOs and individuals find themselves placed at the mercy of state actors, the most powerful legal personalities. The WGAD is unique in that it is the “only non-treaty-based mechanism whose mandate expressly provides for consideration of individual complaints.” Since 1993, it can also take up investigations of its own accord without a specific complaint. Ordinarily, the only recourse for individuals whose international rights have been violated is much lengthier and must be carried out following many steps through the eight UN treaty bodies. They must have exhausted all domestic remedies, their states must be party to the treaty in question, and the state must accept the treaty body’s jurisdiction. Considering that states stand to lose much and gain little should a treaty body find them in violation of human rights, few states agree to jurisdiction and many are not party to any treaties with enforcement bodies at all. Seven of the human rights treaty bodies can consider individual complaints when making their reports on and recommendations to states, but states must usually be a party to an optional protocol of the treaty, as in the case of the Committee Against Torture, through which individual complaints may be considered only if the state has ratified the optional protocol. 

The WGAD operates differently than a treaty body because all states in the Human Rights Council are automatically subject to its opinions, urgent appeals, and country visits. It also makes an annual report to the Human Rights Council that is influential at the time of elections of member states or decisions to suspend members. As a Working Group, the WGAD functions through five elected members instead of a single Special Rapporteur. This organization was necessary for the creation of the WGAD to gain the support of non-Western states that originally saw the Group as a Western imposition. The five members are also aided by a Secretariat that organizes and writes up communications, opinions, urgent appeals, and reports for the group. The creation of the Working Group came after a report made by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities that suggested arbitrary detention was not only a global problem worthy of a Special Procedure but also a problem that had shown a dangerous trend towards expansion throughout the 21^st century. Hoping to avoid political scuffles over the terms describing detention outside of internationally accepted legal norms, the mandate writers settled on “arbitrary detention” which they clarified as encompassing all words relating to imprisonment including detention that is technically legal within domestic confines but that falls outside of international norms. This points to the disturbing trend among states to detain individuals without legal process, incommunicado, secretly, or under administrative detention, all issues listed by the Group in their 2010 report. It also indicates the growing problem of states holding refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers in detention centers legal under domestic law for non-nationals without access to courts or timely release.

The WGAD falls far short of expectations in almost all of these areas, yet it is a vital tool moving forward for countries to be held accountable to their international obligations. Next I will discuss the challenges faced by the WGAD, a working model for increased efficacy, and why, in the end, it is essential that the UN Special Procedures bodies continue to expand and grow to protect human rights for all people.