Part One: The Road Back to Baghdad

Three years after the American withdrawal from Iraq, the broken country we left behind has reared its ugly head and threatens to descend into sectarian civil war. In many ways, the United States is reaping the seeds it sowed in the manner of its exit from Iraq as well as our nearly total non-involvement in Syria’s civil war next door. The road back to Baghdad has been coming for the US ever since we withdrew from the country in 2011 (and, arguable, ever since we waged an uncoordinated mess of an invasion and occupation in 2003). 

Part one of this essay delves into what many have taken to calling “The Iraq We Left Behind,” and possible US strategies to address some of these issues. Part two will discuss the interconnected Syrian conflict’s ramifications in Iraq, and address the question of whether or not Iraq (or any of Syria’s neighbors) will find stability if civil war continues to rage next door. Part three will discuss the US opportunities to eek some good out of this international and regional disaster, especially with longtime adversary Iran.

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 Part One: The Road Back to Baghdad

Central in the story of Iraq’s re-descent into civil war (if, arguably, it ever left it), Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki looms as both villain and longtime partner. Allegedly selected for the Prime Minister post in a shadowy dealing between a CIA officer and the US Ambassador in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, Maliki went from being a relatively unknown but zealous activist in the pro-Shi’ite movement to Prime Minister of Iraq in three months’ time in 2006. Having fled Iraq after his political activities on behalf of the Shi’ite Dawa Party (now his political party) threatened to get him killed, Maliki directed anti-Saddam operations from abroad until the US invaded in 2003. According to Khalilzad in an article by Dexter Filkins, the US only exerted its influence in Iraq to help the election come to the result it wanted. Although American officials had been assured Maliki was "independent" from Iran, it became apparent that he was closer to the Islamic Republic than informants had admitted, and it is now rumored he was hand-picked by the Iranian Al Quds commander Qassem Suleimani. Yet from sideline supporter, America's relationship with Maliki grew in the coming years until the US openly supported Maliki in the subsequent 2010 elections against his secular opponent, Ayad Allawi.

Crimean War Redux

By Guest Contributor Joel Klein
MA Candidate in International Affairs, Boston University

Kerry and Lavrov face off

Recently my fellow graduate student at BU and editor of this blog Vicky wrote an excellent piece on Russia’s invasion of Crimea. While a self-admitted non-expert on Europe or the Former Soviet Union her piece has some excellent analysis and is well worth the read. However as someone who aspires to be an expert on Russia and the Former Soviet Union I wanted to add my 2 cents partly as rebuttal but mostly to inform especially considering our media’s awful coverage. In many ways Vicky and I agree on the many of the United States foreign policy failures and problems in President Obama’s second term. I agree with Vicky’s Meta analysis, our grand strategy is non-existent and the second term National Security process is a disaster. I blame much of this on Obama’s poor second term national security team which possess few independent strategic thinkers.

What many are accurately calling Europe’s most dangerous crisis since the Cold War is a direct result of issues unsettled after the end of that particular “War”. This process along with recent blunders by the EU in particular, but also the United States and Russia, has brought us to this point. For this article I do not comment on these wider international relations issues but analyze the interests of Russia in initiating the Crimean crisis and the potential Western response.