It's Just Africa: Ebola Ravages West Africa

 The World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of the first cases of Ebola in Guinea, West Africa in March 2014. Since then, the virus has spread past Guinea, thanks to the region’s porous borders, into Sierra Leone, Liberia, Senegal, and Nigeria. With a fatality rate of 70%, slightly lower than the 90% fatality rate of past outbreaks, Ebola has had a chance, due to unprepared public health systems and poorly informed citizenry, to spread steadily through the region. Ebola is thought to have spread to humans through fruit bats, which are considered a delicacy for some West Africans, as well as through other types of bush meat such as small rodents.

While Ebola does not spread quite as quickly as the Spanish flu or pre-vaccination days measles, efforts to contain the disease have already exceeded the capacity of public health systems in West Africa. The total case count of the disease has reached 6,574, as of September 29th, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). According to the CDC, the total number of laboratory confirmed cases is 3,626 and the total number of deaths is 3,091. The overwhelming majority of these cases have been documented in Liberia (3,458 total cases, 914 laboratory confirmed cases, and 1,830 deaths), with Sierra Leone running a close second (2,021 total cases, 1,816 laboratory confirmed cases, and 605 deaths). In Senegal, no new cases have been reported since August 29, and in Nigeria, no new cases have been reported since September 5. In Guinea, the infection rate seems to have stabilized.

Giving Thanks for the Iran Nuclear Deal

Every year around Thanksgiving, it is typical, if not cliché, to sit around the table and give reasons to be thankful. This year, I’m thankful for the nuclear deal between the UN and Iran, and said as much at my family dinner, to many groans and eye rolls. Alternately celebrated as a successful performance of diplomacy and decried as the harbinger of nuclear war, the deal has already generated enough controversy to run for New York City mayor. Yet overall, its critics seem to have concerns that have little to do with nuclear weapons, and everything to do with local and regional geopolitics. The deal itself can be hailed as a huge diplomatic success for the United States – which received nearly every concession that it asked for in the negotiations – and a positive first step towards a less nuclear world.

While some are posing the deal as the Iranians pulling one over on the US, in reality the P5+1 negotiators were very successful at extracting concessions from Iran. The deal, outlined in this excellent New York Times infographic, capped enrichment at levels safe for nuclear power only, halted production of new centrifuges as well as construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, mandated that uranium already enriched to 20% be diluted or converted, and overall, extended Iran’s “breakout time” – the time necessary to build a complete nuclear weapon – from less than two months to three or even four months. Essentially, the deal delays Iran’s ability to produce a weapon while still allowing it to have a peaceful nuclear program, which was the entire idea behind the original (US-approved and supported) nuclear program in the 1960s.

In return, Iran has received about $6 billion in sanctions relief over the next six months. Many among the anti-Iran lobby have argued that this will give the government economic breathing room while it continues to develop its nuclear capabilities. While it is true that the sanctions relief, largely in the form of unfreezing petroleum revenue stuck in foreign banks, will provide some breathing room to the Iranian people, in a country that is losing an estimated $5 billion a month due to sanctions, it is just a drop in the bucket. To get further and more meaningful sanctions relief, Iran will need to finalize a permanent deal to come into force after the current six-month deal expires. That will mean more concessions, more oversight, and more opportunities for wary partners like Israel and Saudi Arabia to express their concerns and address them in negotiations. Since the entire point of sanctions is, in theory, to bring a belligerent actor to the negotiating table, the current deal appears to be a rare example of when sanctions actually succeed.

There are still major obstacles to striking a permanent deal with Iran, or even fulfilling the current deal. First and foremost is that the deal includes an agreement on no new sanctions against Iran, something that the US Congress may ignore as they consider passing new sanctions this month. Republicans and many Democrats for once seem able to come together and pass a bill; unfortunately it is one that could compromise a once-in-a-generation opportunity. Another obstacle is the attitudes of two of the United States’ strongest allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Israel, who, like the Congress, are divided on almost every other issue except for Iran’s nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called the deal an “historic mistake” that has thrown Israel’s entire future into jeopardy. Saudi officials have also made rare public statements deploring the secrecy of back-channel talks prior to the public negotiation of the deal.

While the populations of Israel and Saudi Arabia may certainly fear Iran’s acquisition of the bomb, the two countries’ governments are more preoccupied with the threat of an Iran fully integrated into the international economy. These fears were more than amply laid out by Stephen M. Walt in a recent Foreign Policy piece, but in sum, the deal’s opponents have far more to lose from an integrated Iran than a nuclear bomb (no, really). Saudi Arabia has long vied with Iran for dominance in the Middle East, and especially fears Iranian influence on its Shi’ite population, which happens to be located exactly where the largest Saudi oil reserves are. Israel also fears the economic power that Iran could wield if sanctions were lifted, foreseeing that its large, well-educated population could soon overtake Israel as the most developed country in the Middle East An economically empowered Iran would at least would take a bigger piece of the economic pie, which would give it opportunities to project power throughout the region. Detractors (ahem, Ted Cruz) have already held up the example of North Korea (which signed an agreement aimed at denuclearization in 1994 only to test its first nuke in 2006) to decry the current deal. Yet Iran is different for so many reasons, and the bleak warning signs that existed with North Korea have yet to materialize within Iran.

Supporters of Rouhani hold up his picture and celebrate

In Iran, too, there are still challenges to overcome. The country at large reacted with joy at news of the deal: the prospect of sanctions relief, economic recovery, and a legitimate and recognized peaceful nuclear program were greeted with jubilation. Yet many powerful Iranians actually benefit from the sanctions regime through the black market and corruption, and security hardliners who have the ear of Ayatollah Khamenei are unlikely to come on board anytime soon. If the benefits of sanctions relief outweigh the rhetoric of the hardliners, however, the Iranian population and its current administration might stay the current course and remain on track to a permanent deal.

At this moment, I remain cautiously optimistic that this deal will delay the Iranian nuclear project and set the stage for a long-term treaty. While I agree that Iran has a right to a peaceful nuclear program under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I am opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, not least because this would likely lead to a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia and a ramped up regional Cold War. This deal is the first step to ensuring that all sides get the best possible outcome, and is the first shot that diplomats have had in years to end the antagonism between Iran and the United States and its allies. A best-case scenario would be a halt to the Iranian nuclear weapons program, a thawing of relations between Iran and the US and its allies, reintegration of Iran into the global economy, and a better standard of living for Iranian citizens. In international affairs, however, the best-case scenario is rarely the one that plays out. For now, I’ll settle for a temporary halt to the weapons program, and a glimmer of a hope that the decades-long culture of dangerous US-Iran animosity is finally drawing to a close.

Bread over Bombs: Why the US Should Not Strike Syria

Over the last week, The Global Atlas’s metaphorical lights have been off as the three lead contributors were either out of town, dealing with Allston Christmas, and starting the new school year and the flood of students and work that comes with it. In that week, Pres. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have raised the decibel level on the rhetoric surrounding the Syria crisis. Both have confirmed their belief that a chemical attack took place in late August, possibly followed by another; both have pointed the finger at Syrian President Bashar al-Asad; and both have hinted that military strikes will begin soon, but only with congressional approval. The likelihood of a strike increased this morning with the State Dept. ordering all of its non-emergency personnel out of Beirut, and issuing travel warnings for Turkey and Lebanon.

I’ve been pretty vocal in my criticism of the handling of the Syrian crisis, and I’m not about to change now: bombing Asad’s forces would be a huge mistake. It could have the allegedly unintended effect of toppling Asad; it could also very well prevent the use of chemical weapons by either side or others in the future, which of course is a desirable outcome. Yet its other effects would be so negative and detrimental to finding a sustainable peace in Syria that they would vastly outweigh any positives that could result from such a strike. As I have written before, the time for a military intervention has long passed, and toppling Asad without a negotiated settlement in place leaves us with unsavory choices for his replacement.

Syria’s Chemical War

The videos are heart-wrenching to watch: a young boy, screaming and crying with other children in the street while bodies lie around them. A young man convulses uncontrollably, while others are sprawled in the halls of what appears to be an overwhelmed medical clinic; some still shake and show signs of life, others are clearly dead. In what has become a hallmark of videos of massacres in Syria, makeshift morgues lined with scores of corpses leave no doubt that a massive attack has taken place. The surviving victims display many of the hallmark symptoms of sarin gas exposure: convulsions, foaming at the mouth, and dilated pupils, and the scale of the casualties only add weight to this conjecture.

Videos of the attack today in the Ghouta region east of Damascus killing hundreds of civilians will test the United States’ ability to stay out of the two-year-old civil war in Syria. Opposition leaders have already pointed their fingers at beleaguered president and war criminal Bashar al-Asad. US Pres. Barack Obama has previously listed chemical attacks as a “red line” that, if crossed, would automatically trigger American intervention. Yet despite confirming that it had “conclusive evidence” of such an attack in June, the government has yet to deliver the promised military aid to rebel groups. The amount of footage from today’s alleged attack makes it difficult to dispute that something horrific has taken place in Ghouta, yet there is little reason to believe a Western response will go much further than rhetoric and promises of aid.

The Asad regime denies that such an attack took place – and if it did, the government insists that it was at the hands of the opposition. There is, for once, good reason to be suspicious of the attack: it took place just a few miles from where the United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is staying in Damascus, after having arrived in Syria on Sunday. It seems counterintuitive that Asad would order an attack on a location that can be so easily and immediately accessed by UN inspectors, especially so soon after their arrival. The Asad regime has also been winning important battles using conventional methods, and there seems to be no good strategic reason that it would shift tactics now. In the chemical weapons attacks earlier this summer, evidence pointed not only to the regime’s use of sarin, but also to likely rebel use against government forces. Both groups claim the other is trying to frame them, and both may be right. If this is the case in Ghouta, then rebel groups murdered hundreds of their own supporters in order to gain Western support in the seemingly never-ending war against Asad, an unthinkable action.

A man lays an infant to rest among scores of victims. Courtesy AP.

Then again, the Asad regime could be growing increasingly confident that even if the UN team confirms the use of sarin, Western governments will still stay out of the Syrian civil war. Asad is many things, but an idiot isn’t one of them; he can sense as well as anyone else American and European reluctance to get involved in what would be a messy intervention, at a cost of billions of dollars to their already unbalanced budgets, not to mention on the side of rebels who may or may not end up supporting Western interests if they were to gain power. After all, the “conclusive evidence” of the sarin attacks earlier this summer cited by the American government has failed to provoke even the delivery of military aid, let alone boots on the ground.

The UN teams must answer questions of who is culpable for the attacks swiftly if there is to be hope of outside intervention. The conflict has already caused human suffering at a pace and scale that is unprecedented in regional history: over 100,000 have died in the civil war, and more than half of Syria’s population has been displaced both internally and abroad. The addition of chemical weapons will devastate an already shattered country, and lessen the likelihood of a peaceful transition when the dust clears. In the worst case scenario, chemical weapons alongside conventional warfare will render the country Syria a barren failed state, with stronghold controlled by warlords where massacres and human rights violations regularly take place. In the best, a timely intervention by outside forces to establish No-Fly Zones and safe havens for civilians while assisting the rebels to win militarily or force the regime to the negotiating table would at least leave Syria intact as a country. At this point in the conflict, that’s the best we can hope for, and that is nearly as depressing as the West’s lack of intervention for the last two years.

Why the World Needs a Bully: Syria and the Hegemonic Stability Theory

By Guest-Writer Paul Mitchell

Like it or not, the United Nations and the “international community” which it purportedly represents, is allowing the death of a country and endangering the stability – if we can call it that – of the entire Middle East.  Whether you want to call the situation in Syria a mere crisis, a revolution, a revolt, or a rebellion, a reported death toll of over 70,000 people can be called nothing other than an atrocity.  The brutality is magnified by the fact that one side is using military aircraft, armor, and weaponry, and is fighting a civilian force that had been largely disarmed over years of oppressive rule.  With recent reports that chemical weapons have been used, and with a US President that had implicitly drawn a line in the sand regarding the use of such weapons, something has to be done, right?  Unfortunately, with a US President who, like former President Bill Clinton, believes whole-heartedly in the merits and capabilities of the United Nations, the answer is no.