Drawing Battle Lines in the Middle East

While it has often been overshadowed by more pressing issues in headlines, the bellicosity Iran and Saudi Arabia have for decades shown one another is arguably one of the most pressing concerns for the region. The culmination of events over the weekend involving the two countries - Saudia Arabia's mass execution of 47 individuals including a prominent Shiite cleric, and the subsequent violent protests occurring at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Iran - underscore this point perfectly. Now the Middle East, a region already at the precipice of outright catastrophe, is in a particularly precarious position. What happens next between the two countries will reverberate across the entire Middle East and, in certain ways, the globe.

Saudi Arabia has long been a bastion of Sunni Islam while Iran, for decades the black sheep of the region, has been a home to Shiites, the minority of the two in the region. As far back as the Revolution in 1979, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been seen as bitter enemies, constantly attempting to one-up one another and choosing proxy battlegrounds along the way.

Two of these battlegrounds exist right now: Syria and Yemen. Since the uprising began in Syria five years ago, Iran has desperately attempted to help prop up President Asad, who is of a minority Shiite sect called Alawite. Unlike its leader, however, Syria is a predominantly Sunni state--giving Saudi Arabia entree into the conflict in an attempt to restore power to the majority religious population.

Anti-Saudi Arabia protest. Courtesy of WSJ

A civil war has similarly erupted in Yemen and continues to serve as a proxy battle for Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have taken sides. In a particularly decisive move, Saudi Arabia began conducting airstrikes and providing military support on a mass scale to the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Iran, meanwhile, has been providing military and logistical support to the houthi insurgency, loyal to former Yemeni President Saleh, which has waged all-out warfare against the sitting government.

These battles have had lasting repercussions for the entire region--most notably the governance vacuums they have created in Syria and Yemen that have permitted the Islamic State to thrive. The emerging diplomatic conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia may prove to be a much more urgent geopolitical issue, however.

Tragically, the disagreement comes just as progress was being made in Syria peace talks. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have participated in multi-national talks in recent weeks, demonstrating the possibility of a preliminary agreement being reached in the coming months. Hundreds of thousands have died in Syria to date and much of the country has been reduced to rubble--it is well past time that a ceasefire was negotiated. Should tensions continue to flare between Iran and Saudi Arabia, however, it is likely that the scheduled talks in Geneva later this month will be put on hold--something the Syrian people cannot afford.

Secretary of State Kerry with Saudi King Salman. Courtesy of WSJ

The disagreement also has the possibility of undermining the Iran nuclear agreement that was signed last year. The United States has been placed in a precarious position: on one hand, President Obama is striving to improve relations with Tehran following the agreement in an effort to not only strengthen the agreement, but make Iran less of a hostile player in the region. Iran tests of ballistic missiles in recent weeks have caused distrust and stoked anger in the U.S. as well as Iran; the U.S. cannot afford any more issues. Saudi Arabia, however, is the leading ally of the U.S. in the region, and will see any warmth towards Iran as hostility towards themselves and a degradation of the relationship. President Obama must walk the diplomatic tightrope and ensure that both sides feel that they are being treated respectfully.

Finally, the disagreement has and will continue to affect the global oil market. Brent shares fell on Monday on news of Saudi Arabia's decision to sever diplomatic ties with Iran. With Middle Eastern countries producing so much of the world's oil, the reminder that it remains a highly volatile region will be unsettling to investors. Further, while Saudi Arabia has vowed to keep production high, any escalation in conflict that more quickly drains their monetary reserves will result in a halt of production, sending oil prices soaring and hurting American consumers.

As of today, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have all severed diplomatic ties with Iran following the protests in Tehran over the weekend. The United Arab Emirates has also downgraded their diplomatic ties. It is unclear how Iran will respond, but the United States is urging both sides to exercise caution moving forward. The entire region's stability likely depends on it.

On the Anniversary of Hiroshima, a New Nuclear Crossroads

Today marks a somber anniversary, the 70^th anniversary since the United States dropped the first of two nuclear weapons on Japan. Seven decades ago today, the US, ostensibly to end WWII in the Pacific, dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, followed three days later by a nuclear attack on Nagasaki. In the aftermath, hundreds of thousands of people died in the two cities, and over one hundred thousand were killed in the initial blasts alone. The nuclear weapons used in the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were comparatively small compared to the destructive power of nuclear weapons today, and they still devastated two large cities. Japan marked the occasion with speeches by the few remaining survivors, a national moment of silence, and the tolling of a bell.

Pres. Obama speaks on the nuclear deal at American University

The anniversary comes at a moment when the United States faces yet another nuclear crossroads: whether or not to enact a nuclear deal reached with Iranian negotiators on July 14. On one side stands the Obama administration, which negotiated the deal and hopes to pass it through a Congressional vote, despite significant, somewhat bipartisan opposition. On the other stand politicians from both sides of the aisle, although largely Republican, who say the deal will not stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and argue that the US should continue the current sanctions regime in the hopes of obtaining a better deal. If such a deal never materializes, then armed intervention in Iran becomes an option.

The Iranian Nuclear Agreement: What Does it Mean for US Diplomacy and International Trade in the Middle East?

Photo by United States Department of State (Public Domain)

On April 2^nd, the members of the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran reached an agreement on the framework for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program, outlining a set of parameters for a final agreement to be drafted by June 30^th. Although a final comprehensive deal palatable to all parties will prove to be difficult, this framework agreement marks a milestone achievement in negotiations that have spanned over a decade. The nuclear accord faces resistance, however, by lawmakers in both the US and Iran, as it would require a broad leap of faith between two countries that have been at odds for over thirty years and have competing national interests in the region. An agreement with Iran would also call into question existing US alliances in the Middle East and lead to increased Russian influence in the region.

News of the agreement evoked mixed reactions from US lawmakers, with the Senate drafting a bipartisan bill that would allow Congressional oversight on the final deal. President Obama agreed to sign the existing bill, allowing a hold on lifting sanctions during a 30-day congressional review of the final accord. Nevertheless, both President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry stated that they would not allow Congress to stand in the way of the best deal possible.

Many US lawmakers are hesitant to believe that the Iranian government will abide by its obligations under any agreement regarding the nuclear program, and their mistrust was exacerbated by the discrepancies between the fact sheets issued by the US and Iranian governments regarding the framework agreement.

The US fact sheet states that Iran will reduce the number of installed centrifuges to 6,104 IR-1s (Iran’s first-generation centrifuge) to lengthen Iran’s breakout time to one year (versus 2-3 months). Furthermore, IAEA inspections would be conducted on all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and access would be provided for UN inspectors to examine suspicious sites and investigate any allegations of covert facilities. Should the IAEA confirm that Iran has held up its end of the final comprehensive deal, US and EU nuclear-related sanctions would be suspended. The framework also references a restructuring of UN Security Council resolutions in order to lift the past resolutions regarding the nuclear issue. Yet, other US sanctions and UN resolutions related to terrorism, ballistic missiles, human rights violations, and cargo inspections would remain in force.

Contrary to the US fact sheet, Iran’s fact sheet states that sanctions will be lifted at the time of the agreement, Iran will keep operating 10,000 centrifuges and not allow inspections of military sites, the Fordow site will continue enrichment activities, and the limits on the nuclear program will remain in effect for only 5 years.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani acknowledged that drafting the final deal would prove to be the true hurdle of the negotiations, but highlighted that the advancement of negotiations to this late stage reflected an international commitment to the process. Meanwhile, other Iranian politicians expressed their frustration with the reaction from Congress and Iran’s lack of recourse should the P5+1 fail to meet their obligations under the deal. Analysts in the US remain optimistic that all parties will come to a deal through “creative negotiations” and speculated that the Iranian fact sheet was prepared by Iranian hardliners in response to the proposed US Congressional review of the agreement.

The framework agreement currently enjoys broad support from Iranian civil society as it promises the possibility of sanctions relief and economic growth. Sanctions relief should stabilize the foreign exchange rate and inflation, boost foreign private sector investments and domestic job creation, and increase foreign trade as businesses anticipate a sharp rise in economic and financial activity. Resuming oil production and exports will increase Iran’s hard currency revenues and should theoretically also revitalize its economy. This will ideally entrench the power of Iran’s moderates upon whom rest any hope of positive US-Iran relations in the coming years.

The prospect of a nuclear deal seemingly threatens Saudi Arabia, who believes that positive US-Iranian diplomatic relations and sanctions relief will lead to Iranian crude exports driving down oil prices and revenues, and fears that its long-standing alliance with the US will be in jeopardy. A change in oil prices is unlikely, however, as analysts believe that, while Iran should be able to export up to 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day by early 2016, the steady increase in global demand for oil should prevent this influx from impacting prices.

Despite Saudi fears and the fact that improved US-Iranian diplomatic relations will allow for cooperation against certain regional threats like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the US is not likely to drop its alliance with Saudi Arabia. Iran’s aid to Houthi rebels in Yemen has been detrimental to both the United States and Saudi Arabia, which has led to the US providing logistics and intelligence support to the Saudis.

The current Saudi campaign in Yemen is more than likely a show of force, intended to both distract from the nuclear deal negotiations and to remind the US of its existing alliance in the region. As a result, Saudi Arabia will likely scale back its campaign in Yemen once the nuclear deal is finalized. The current situation, however, exemplifies the contradictory interests the US will have to consider in the region for years to come should the nuclear deal come to fruition.

A nuclear deal also promises greater direct Russian influence in the Middle East through resumed trade relations between Russia and Iran. Naturally, US and Israeli lawmakers are suspicious of this relationship, as it brings the competing interests of another major world power into the region. The framework agreement has already prompted Russian President Vladimir Putin to lift a five-year ban on the delivery of the S-300 air defense missile system to Iran by the end of the year. Russia and Iran had agreed to the $800-million contract in 2007, but the delivery had been suspended in 2010 under strong objections from the United States and Israel. Iran hopes to receive the S-300s by the end of the year, but Nikolai Patrushev, head of Russia’s Security Council, noted that manufacturers needed at least half a year to complete production. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed his country’s interest in the success of this nuclear agreement with Iran and the lifting of all sanctions, stating that “[Russia is] confident that de-escalation of tension around Iran will improve bilateral trade-and-economic ties and, correspondingly, will be beneficial for Russia.”

Thawing the icy relationship between the US and Iran that has persisted for the past 36 years has vast implications for future diplomatic and trade efforts. Whether or not the nuclear deal could bring stability to this historically turbulent region remains to be seen, but at the very least, the opportunity to negotiate with Iran as a legitimate state actor instead of dismissing it as a rogue state opens the door to diplomatic approaches to the bigger issues in the region: the sectarian fighting between the Sunni and Shia populations in Syria and Iraq, the Houthi uprising in Yemen, and the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The real challenge will be bringing to the negotiating table competing regional interests and finding diplomatic solutions to these problems.

This article originally appeared on Ramen IR, an international affairs blog.

Negotiations Deadline Extended Again for Iran and P5-1

Iran and the P5+1 reached the deadline of their nuclear talks yesterday without any consensus. The talks have gone on for months between Iran and the five permanent UN Security Council member nations (plus Germany), with a questionable amount of progress being made. However, yesterday did not mark the end of the talks - the deadline was simply extended another seven months. Is this a good or bad thing for the United States? Well, perhaps it's both.

The biggest thing to take away from yesterday's deadline extension is that the deadline was extended at all. Clearly both sides see the importance in reaching a consensus on such an important issue, and the fact that all parties involved wish to remain involved could itself be seen as a success. However, a more pessimistic observation would be that despite months of negotiations, the parties have still been unable to find common ground - what could seven more months possibly achieve?

There is more good news, however, in the fact that Iran will continue to bear the brunt of all sanctions while negotiations continue. The economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran have crippled the country, bringing urgency to the table on the part of Iranian President Rouhani who is trying to turn his economy around. In addition to economic sanctions, Iran continues to accept stringent nuclear inspection policies, meaning they will be highly scrutinized for the next seven months to ensure they are not continuing their nuclear development as negotiations stall.

However, the public on both sides is becoming less and less patient with the talks, and the next seven months may quite possibly be the longest that successful negotiations can take. In Iran, criticism has risen over Iran "giving too much away". In the U.S., warhawks on the right have criticized the Obama Administration for appearing weak - especially by extending the deadline - and have called for outright military action against Iran if negotiations fail (note: this is not a good negotiating strategy).

If there is to be any accord reached on this sensitive issue, it must come within the next several months. A deal with Iran on its nuclear development will be a significant precedent on nuclear policy and a major win for President Obama as he gears up to leave office. For Iran, it will mark the first time in years that their economy will have an opportunity to bounce back from harsh sanctions they have endured. And for everyone, it will mean one less country with nuclear weapons - something we should all be happy about.

Giving Thanks for the Iran Nuclear Deal

Every year around Thanksgiving, it is typical, if not cliché, to sit around the table and give reasons to be thankful. This year, I’m thankful for the nuclear deal between the UN and Iran, and said as much at my family dinner, to many groans and eye rolls. Alternately celebrated as a successful performance of diplomacy and decried as the harbinger of nuclear war, the deal has already generated enough controversy to run for New York City mayor. Yet overall, its critics seem to have concerns that have little to do with nuclear weapons, and everything to do with local and regional geopolitics. The deal itself can be hailed as a huge diplomatic success for the United States – which received nearly every concession that it asked for in the negotiations – and a positive first step towards a less nuclear world.

While some are posing the deal as the Iranians pulling one over on the US, in reality the P5+1 negotiators were very successful at extracting concessions from Iran. The deal, outlined in this excellent New York Times infographic, capped enrichment at levels safe for nuclear power only, halted production of new centrifuges as well as construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, mandated that uranium already enriched to 20% be diluted or converted, and overall, extended Iran’s “breakout time” – the time necessary to build a complete nuclear weapon – from less than two months to three or even four months. Essentially, the deal delays Iran’s ability to produce a weapon while still allowing it to have a peaceful nuclear program, which was the entire idea behind the original (US-approved and supported) nuclear program in the 1960s.

In return, Iran has received about $6 billion in sanctions relief over the next six months. Many among the anti-Iran lobby have argued that this will give the government economic breathing room while it continues to develop its nuclear capabilities. While it is true that the sanctions relief, largely in the form of unfreezing petroleum revenue stuck in foreign banks, will provide some breathing room to the Iranian people, in a country that is losing an estimated $5 billion a month due to sanctions, it is just a drop in the bucket. To get further and more meaningful sanctions relief, Iran will need to finalize a permanent deal to come into force after the current six-month deal expires. That will mean more concessions, more oversight, and more opportunities for wary partners like Israel and Saudi Arabia to express their concerns and address them in negotiations. Since the entire point of sanctions is, in theory, to bring a belligerent actor to the negotiating table, the current deal appears to be a rare example of when sanctions actually succeed.

There are still major obstacles to striking a permanent deal with Iran, or even fulfilling the current deal. First and foremost is that the deal includes an agreement on no new sanctions against Iran, something that the US Congress may ignore as they consider passing new sanctions this month. Republicans and many Democrats for once seem able to come together and pass a bill; unfortunately it is one that could compromise a once-in-a-generation opportunity. Another obstacle is the attitudes of two of the United States’ strongest allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Israel, who, like the Congress, are divided on almost every other issue except for Iran’s nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called the deal an “historic mistake” that has thrown Israel’s entire future into jeopardy. Saudi officials have also made rare public statements deploring the secrecy of back-channel talks prior to the public negotiation of the deal.

While the populations of Israel and Saudi Arabia may certainly fear Iran’s acquisition of the bomb, the two countries’ governments are more preoccupied with the threat of an Iran fully integrated into the international economy. These fears were more than amply laid out by Stephen M. Walt in a recent Foreign Policy piece, but in sum, the deal’s opponents have far more to lose from an integrated Iran than a nuclear bomb (no, really). Saudi Arabia has long vied with Iran for dominance in the Middle East, and especially fears Iranian influence on its Shi’ite population, which happens to be located exactly where the largest Saudi oil reserves are. Israel also fears the economic power that Iran could wield if sanctions were lifted, foreseeing that its large, well-educated population could soon overtake Israel as the most developed country in the Middle East An economically empowered Iran would at least would take a bigger piece of the economic pie, which would give it opportunities to project power throughout the region. Detractors (ahem, Ted Cruz) have already held up the example of North Korea (which signed an agreement aimed at denuclearization in 1994 only to test its first nuke in 2006) to decry the current deal. Yet Iran is different for so many reasons, and the bleak warning signs that existed with North Korea have yet to materialize within Iran.

Supporters of Rouhani hold up his picture and celebrate

In Iran, too, there are still challenges to overcome. The country at large reacted with joy at news of the deal: the prospect of sanctions relief, economic recovery, and a legitimate and recognized peaceful nuclear program were greeted with jubilation. Yet many powerful Iranians actually benefit from the sanctions regime through the black market and corruption, and security hardliners who have the ear of Ayatollah Khamenei are unlikely to come on board anytime soon. If the benefits of sanctions relief outweigh the rhetoric of the hardliners, however, the Iranian population and its current administration might stay the current course and remain on track to a permanent deal.

At this moment, I remain cautiously optimistic that this deal will delay the Iranian nuclear project and set the stage for a long-term treaty. While I agree that Iran has a right to a peaceful nuclear program under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I am opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, not least because this would likely lead to a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia and a ramped up regional Cold War. This deal is the first step to ensuring that all sides get the best possible outcome, and is the first shot that diplomats have had in years to end the antagonism between Iran and the United States and its allies. A best-case scenario would be a halt to the Iranian nuclear weapons program, a thawing of relations between Iran and the US and its allies, reintegration of Iran into the global economy, and a better standard of living for Iranian citizens. In international affairs, however, the best-case scenario is rarely the one that plays out. For now, I’ll settle for a temporary halt to the weapons program, and a glimmer of a hope that the decades-long culture of dangerous US-Iran animosity is finally drawing to a close.

Iran Nuclear Talks: Global fusion or global fission?

In the early years of Pres. George W. Bush’s presidency, things had never looked better for US-Iranian relations. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was elected for a second term in 2001, and he was known as a reformer looking to reconcile Iran with the US for the first time since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Although the terms “liberal” and “reformist” are relative – especially in Iranian politics, which are always guided by the Grand Ayatollah – he offered a glimpse of a “dialogue among civilizations” rather than Samuel Huntington’s famous Clash of Civilizations.

Pres. Khatami’s words were more than rhetoric. Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States at the hands of Islamist extremists, he was one of the first world leaders to offer his condolences to the American people and subsequently offered important policies of military support for the US invasion of Afghanistan. He promised that Iran would return any American military personnel that landed in Iranian territory, close its borders to Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida, ask the Northern Alliance to facilitate US efforts in Afghanistan, and cooperate with Pakistan to assist in the creation of a new government. Since the invasion in 2001, Iran’s interests in Afghanistan have largely lined up with those of the US, and the country has provided important infusions of aid and investment throughout eastern and central Afghanistan.

Netanyahu's Misguided Attack Against Iran - One Step Back for Nuclear Talks?

U.S.-Iran relations in recent weeks have been at their highest point in probably the last 4 decades, leaving many optimistic about continuing progress in nuclear talks. Iranian President Rouhani and President Obama have had the first President-to-President talks in years, and eagerness from Rouhani on improving Iran's relationship with the western world seems genuine and refreshing, compared to the bellicosity and harsh words former President Ahmadinejad was know for. But despite these improvements, U.S. ally and stalwart in the Middle East, Israel, has not been convinced. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has remained steadfast in his disapproval and leeriness of Iranian intentions, continuously referring to Rouhani as "a wolf in sheep's clothing." Although it has not appeared to affect talks between Iran and the U.S., it is not guaranteed that it won't in the future.

In possibly the worst move in recent weeks, Netanyahu gave an interview to the Persian arm of the BBC news channel on Thursday night regarding Iran, drawing serious ire from not the Iranian government, but this time the Iranian public. Ironically, Netanyahu's appeal to the Iranian public to stand up against their government backfired entirely; Netanyahu ignorantly referenced the Iranian people's inability to listen to western music or to wear denim jeans, while also repeatedly discrediting the most recent presidential election and saying the Iranian public "deserved better."

Obviously, this interview was not warmly received by the intended recipients. Iranian youth took to twitter and other social media outlets ridiculing Netanyahu, showing pictures of their jeans, iPods, and other western cultural items. Furthermore, Netanyahu referenced 2009 antigovernment protests - specifically a women who's death was caught on camera and ignited sympathy and anger from around the world - without seeming to have recalled (or cared) that the women who had died was in fact wearing jeans in the video. The question all of this leaves is whether Netanyahu had ulterior motives in giving the interview, something perhaps unseen by someone like myself or the countless other individuals who saw it, or whether he truly was so in the dark on contemporary Iranian culture that he could make such inaccurate comments.

Given that Israel is significantly closer in proximity to Iran, and that the two have experienced an arguably worse relationship over the years than the U.S. has, it is understandable that Netanyahu has been unmoved by what others would see as optimistic progress in the recent nuclear talks. And, in defense of Netanyahu, the talks as of yet have been preliminary, and it will be important to see President Rouhani step up to the plate and begin implementing serious changes in the way Iran runs its nuclear program. Until then, talk is just talk, and it won't be the first time promising nuclear attacks have failed. However, there is serious reason to believe Rouhani is committed to changes - due to crippling economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European countries, Iran's economy is in serious trouble, and improving relations with the western world could over time substantially mitigate this. And Netanyahu's stubbornness when it comes to Iran, while not hurting nuclear talks yet, is certainly not helping them. Expressing concern and raising legitimate qualms is a reasonable thing for a country in Israel's position to do; publicly making inaccurate, disparaging remarks is not. It is in the best interest of Israel, and the United States, that Netanyahu begin to trust the talks more and join the nuclear talks as a productive state, and begin helping move things along more.

Will Diplomacy Really Save the Middle East?

Two weeks ago, President Obama was carefully weighing his options for a U.S. response to allegations that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons on civilians – options that included a unilateral military strike. In a world where these days, many countries choose to impress influence on others militarily, a military strike was certainly not out of the realm of realistic and understandable possibilities. However, the past week has demonstrated that countries can still work together, and get things done, without military force. Between the Syrian chemical weapons deal and the latest developments in Iran, President Obama has averted the political mess of a military strike and has new hope for peaceful negotiations in the Middle East.

I will be the first to admit that at the news of Russia’s diplomatic proposal for Syria to surrender their chemical weapons, I was extremely skeptical. The feasibility of actually destroying the weapons seemed not to have been considered, and Russia’s track record with cooperation did not reinforce any confidence in their ability to execute the plan successfully. And while I still have my reservations, things have moved forward as they were supposed to. Syria is documenting their chemical stockpiles, and once this assessment has been made, the next steps will be securing and eventually destroying them.

Meanwhile in Iran, the recently elected Prime Minister Hassan Rouhani has seemed more open to nuclear negotiations with the United States than his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ever was. After years upon years of crippling sanctions imposed upon Iran not only by the U.S. but much of the Western world, perhaps this has simply been a long time coming. However, as my colleague Vicky pointed out, Prime Minister Rouhani and President Obama are the most politically aligned counterparts in the Iran-U.S. relationship in at least 20 years. Political incompatibility cannot foster cooperation, and it’s important to keep this in mind as Iran and the U.S. move forward in hopefully assuaging our nuclear fears once and for all while preserving Iran’s dignity and allowing nuclear energy creation in some capacity.

Diplomacy hinges on trust, though – something that the U.S. more or less lacks entirely when it comes to Syria and Iran. There is certainly reason to remain leery of these processes as they continue to unfold over the next several weeks and months. However, for the time being, this is a victory for Obama and a monumental indication to the rest of the world that diplomacy is not obsolete.

UN Arms Trade Treaty Overwhelmingly Approved

In the summer of 2012, I wrote an article on the failure of the international community to reach a voting consensus on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), despite the almost 10-year lobbying effort to get the treaty signed into international law. Various problems with the treaty came to the fore back in July 2012, mainly that the U.S. and Russia claimed they didn't know how the treaty would affect their domestic laws. It was a frustrating end to what could have been a monumental addition to international law; a treaty designed to regulate trade worth $70 billion annually. Good news came roughly 9 months later: two days ago, the Arms Trade Treaty was brought to a majority vote and received overwhelming international backing. Only three countries in the UN General Assembly voted against it (North Korea, Iran and Syria) while great power arms manufacturers China and Russia abstained. Despite a few small issues, the treaty may very well prove to be a guiding law in future policy discussions, especially concerning the three conspicuous nations that voted against the measure.

United Nations General Assembly chamber. Photo by Chris Erbach.

From Iron Dome to the Arrow 3

Last November, as delineated in a past article, Israel launched a military operation targeting Islamist militants--chiefly Hamas--and their capacity to fire rockets into mainland Israel. Operation Pillar of Defense, as it was called, debuted the Jewish state's Iron Dome missile defense system, which intercepted just under a third of the missiles launched from Gaza. The Iron Dome was an important step forward for Israel's "multilayered defense system" and adds extra missile defense capacity along with the existing David's Sling and Arrow 2 missile defense systems. The new missile defense system--dubbed the Arrow 3--is designed to target Iranian Shihab 3 missiles and other long-range rockets. The joint Israeli-American project was tested today with remarkable success, and it's set to be fully operational by 2016.

A diagram of the Arrow 3 defense system. From JPost.