Since
1998, the world has lived with two openly nuclear neighbors with a troubling
relationship. India and Pakistan have never enjoyed completely amicable
relations since independence and partition in 1947. The acquisition of nuclear
weapons by both powers have had analysts predicting alternately Armageddon and
a stable subcontinent ever since. India tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974
but refrained from launching another test for over 20 years, until 1998 when it
tested its first fusion weapon. In response, Pakistan launched 6 missiles, officially
joining the global nuclear club. Neither country is a signatory to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus were not in contravention of international
law in proliferating. Yet the international community’s initial response was
one of dual-sided approbation and fear, especially given the two countries’
long-standing territorial dispute in Kashmir. Pakistan had been supporting the
Kashmiri insurgency as well as other uprisings within India for decades, and
now there was real danger of escalation of conflicts to the nuclear level in
the minds of scholars and policymakers alike. Alarm bells were ringing in South
Asian circles with many predicting that there would be a new and equally
dangerous “Cold War” on the sub-continent.
In
the 15 years since the last nuclear tests, Pakistan and India have weathered
many major crises, including the Kargil War and the 2001-2002/2008 terrorist
attacks and subsequent conventional mobilization. This pattern of approaching
and retreating from the nuclear threshold has elicited a variety of analyses
and associated policy recommendations. Many compare the situation to the
“stability-instability paradox” that functioned to prevent nuclear conflict in
the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States but allowed
low-level and proxy conventional conflicts to flourish. Others disagree and say
that this is a new situation with a different stability-instability dynamic at
work. Some posit that nuclear weapons are not the key factor in determining the
prospects for conflict between India and Pakistan and that external parties or
organizational aspects of the government or military are to blame. Yet all
arrive at a nearly identical set of policy recommendations: the United States
needs to maintain a high level of engagement with both countries; more command
and control structures must be developed, especially in Pakistan; both
countries need to make clear their nuclear postures and policies, including
those related to safety and security; and top-tier communication must be
undertaken by both governments as they work towards a negotiated settlement in
Kashmir.
What
has emerged in South Asia is a pattern of continual escalations along the
border on the conventional level, but a retreat from conflict before the
nuclear threshold is even close to being breached. In fact, escalations have
cooled down over time, with the most dangerous occurring during the Kargil War
in 1999 when both Pakistan and India appeared to have readied and deployed
nuclear weapons. Yet as Vernie Liebl points out in his assessment of the two
countries’ nuclear policies and strategies, deployment “does not mean that
nuclear-tipped units have been deployed to their launching areas for war” (161),
WHAT DOES IT MEAN. In the major incidents since, India has deployed massive
conventional forces to but never across the border, and Pakistan has shown
similar restraint. Even “spoiler” terrorist attacks by Pakistani militant
groups suspected to enjoy government support, especially in 2002 and 2008, did
not manage to bring the two countries to blowS. While the continual escalations
do create a troubling window of opportunity for low-level conflicts to spiral
out of control, they have lowered in intensity of military and government
responses despite some scholars’ worst predictions. Moving forward, they are
likely to continue on this trend of amelioration and a new age in
India-Pakistan relations could be at hand. As both countries shift their focus
to economic development and maintenance of severe internal problems, their
leaderships have an opportunity and incentive to increase cooperation, seek
settlement of long-standing disputes, and open the door to more regional trade
and less instability. Yet the peace is by no means assured. As the United
States withdraws from Afghanistan in 2014, it must not lose crucial interest in
the world’s most dangerous neighborhood. Potential for conflict remains in the
form of Kashmir, terrorism, and increasingly, water issues at the border.
No comments:
Post a Comment