Drawing Battle Lines in the Middle East

While it has often been overshadowed by more pressing issues in headlines, the bellicosity Iran and Saudi Arabia have for decades shown one another is arguably one of the most pressing concerns for the region. The culmination of events over the weekend involving the two countries - Saudia Arabia's mass execution of 47 individuals including a prominent Shiite cleric, and the subsequent violent protests occurring at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Iran - underscore this point perfectly. Now the Middle East, a region already at the precipice of outright catastrophe, is in a particularly precarious position. What happens next between the two countries will reverberate across the entire Middle East and, in certain ways, the globe.

Saudi Arabia has long been a bastion of Sunni Islam while Iran, for decades the black sheep of the region, has been a home to Shiites, the minority of the two in the region. As far back as the Revolution in 1979, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been seen as bitter enemies, constantly attempting to one-up one another and choosing proxy battlegrounds along the way.

Two of these battlegrounds exist right now: Syria and Yemen. Since the uprising began in Syria five years ago, Iran has desperately attempted to help prop up President Asad, who is of a minority Shiite sect called Alawite. Unlike its leader, however, Syria is a predominantly Sunni state--giving Saudi Arabia entree into the conflict in an attempt to restore power to the majority religious population.

Anti-Saudi Arabia protest. Courtesy of WSJ

A civil war has similarly erupted in Yemen and continues to serve as a proxy battle for Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have taken sides. In a particularly decisive move, Saudi Arabia began conducting airstrikes and providing military support on a mass scale to the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Iran, meanwhile, has been providing military and logistical support to the houthi insurgency, loyal to former Yemeni President Saleh, which has waged all-out warfare against the sitting government.

These battles have had lasting repercussions for the entire region--most notably the governance vacuums they have created in Syria and Yemen that have permitted the Islamic State to thrive. The emerging diplomatic conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia may prove to be a much more urgent geopolitical issue, however.

Tragically, the disagreement comes just as progress was being made in Syria peace talks. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have participated in multi-national talks in recent weeks, demonstrating the possibility of a preliminary agreement being reached in the coming months. Hundreds of thousands have died in Syria to date and much of the country has been reduced to rubble--it is well past time that a ceasefire was negotiated. Should tensions continue to flare between Iran and Saudi Arabia, however, it is likely that the scheduled talks in Geneva later this month will be put on hold--something the Syrian people cannot afford.

Secretary of State Kerry with Saudi King Salman. Courtesy of WSJ

The disagreement also has the possibility of undermining the Iran nuclear agreement that was signed last year. The United States has been placed in a precarious position: on one hand, President Obama is striving to improve relations with Tehran following the agreement in an effort to not only strengthen the agreement, but make Iran less of a hostile player in the region. Iran tests of ballistic missiles in recent weeks have caused distrust and stoked anger in the U.S. as well as Iran; the U.S. cannot afford any more issues. Saudi Arabia, however, is the leading ally of the U.S. in the region, and will see any warmth towards Iran as hostility towards themselves and a degradation of the relationship. President Obama must walk the diplomatic tightrope and ensure that both sides feel that they are being treated respectfully.

Finally, the disagreement has and will continue to affect the global oil market. Brent shares fell on Monday on news of Saudi Arabia's decision to sever diplomatic ties with Iran. With Middle Eastern countries producing so much of the world's oil, the reminder that it remains a highly volatile region will be unsettling to investors. Further, while Saudi Arabia has vowed to keep production high, any escalation in conflict that more quickly drains their monetary reserves will result in a halt of production, sending oil prices soaring and hurting American consumers.

As of today, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have all severed diplomatic ties with Iran following the protests in Tehran over the weekend. The United Arab Emirates has also downgraded their diplomatic ties. It is unclear how Iran will respond, but the United States is urging both sides to exercise caution moving forward. The entire region's stability likely depends on it.

Apocalypse Now: Islamic State's Real Strategic Goal

Forty-five people burned alive in western Iraq. Twenty-one Egyptian Coptic Christians beheaded by the sea in Libya. Five Western aid workers and journalists executed, one Jordanian pilot incinerated, and two possibly related terrorist attacks in Western Cities. All in addition to the tens of thousands  of victims killed or forced into displacement by fighting in northern Syria and Iraq. If Islamic State is seeking to bring about signs of End Times, they are doing a pretty good job. Increasingly, policymakers are forced to take seriously the Islamic State’s self-declared mission: to bring about the Day of Judgment by sowing chaos in the world in the lead-up to the return of the Mahdi.

The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse ride Toyotas, who knew?

The only thing more terrifying than a power-hungry Islamic State that uses scripture as a pretext for brutality is one that actually believes in it. While Al Qaeda’s stated goals were largely ones of retribution against the West and its allies for perceived injuries to the Muslim-majority world, the Islamic State's doctrine has confounded policymakers due to its seemingly earnest belief that the apocalypse – and thus paradise for true believers – is at hand, and indeed can be pushed along by worldly deeds. Drawing upon Koranic texts that suggest the End Times will be signified by a battle between the armies of “Islam” and “Rome” in northern Syria (in the town Dabiq, which Islamic State already controls and has named its journal after), the Islamic State strategy of directly goading the United States into intervening in Syria and Iraq becomes much more rational. By drawing the US into battle, Islamic State would have its “Army of Rome.” And defeat of this army is just the first phase of the apocalypse.

Obama's New AUMF Lacks Much Needed Oomph

Yesterday, in a letter to the United States Congress, President Obama formally requested an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in the fight against the Islamic State. Obama has been operating under and defending the current strategy against ISIS as within the scope of the two AUMFs passed under President Bush: the 2001 AUMF, which authorized combat operations in Afghanistan, and the 2002 AUMF, which authorized the Iraq War from 2003-2011. The President has sufficient authority as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to conduct the current operations against ISIS, but opposition has grown louder in the face of the terrorists’ expansion into Syria.

The AUMF proposed by the Obama Administration limits authorization to three years, thus avoiding embroiling the US in large-scale ground combat operations with no end in sight, which was the case with the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The President’s AUMF does not address the enduring 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and while it restricts the use of ground combat operations, it also excludes existing ground troops (ex. the US military personnel currently in Iraq) from these restrictions. This AUMF would allow the President to deploy new military personnel in the roles of intelligence collection and sharing, advisers, special operations forces, combat search and rescue personnel and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers to assist US air strikes. Lastly, this AUMF would sunset the 2002 AUMF, but not the 2001 AUMF, as the latter serves as legal justification for the broader war on terror.

Two aspects of this proposal are striking: it commits President Obama’s successor to operating under its terms for at least the first year of office; and it also does not significantly expand existing efforts against ISIS in any way. The proposed AUMF seems to lend political cover to ongoing operations against ISIS, which are comprised primarily of targeted airstrikes and operations against ISIS under Operation Inherent Resolve. This strategy has also placed upwards of 1,400 US military personnel in Iraq and costs on average $8.4 million per day.

The current strategy, according to President Obama’s announcement last September is to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State. The new AUMF proposes a continuation of this strategy, even through our current efforts seem to be yielding very little in the way of military gains against this fluid enemy. The existing military operations against ISIS will not accomplish the intended goal of annihilating the terrorist group as it has proven much more dynamic, adaptable, and better funded and staffed than previous threats.

Containing, let alone defeating, ISIS will require a robust and much more comprehensive military effort, which is possible under the terms of the current AUMF, but which may not necessarily be palatable to the American public. The new AUMF promises to prevent another open-ended military commitment to the region, but perhaps also promises to prevent significant victories against this terrorist outfit.

House of Kurds: ISIS-Kurdish Fighting Threatens Turkey’s Stability

Intense fighting between ISIS and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters over the past month for control of the strategic city of Kobani on the Turkish-Syrian border threatens not only domestic stability within Turkey, but also the peace process between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 

Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Legacy of Interventionism

My colleague Colin Wolfgang recently wrote about Pres. Obama’s speech last Wednesday, in which the president announced that US airstrikes would extend from Iraq into Syria to combat the growing threat of the terrorist group ISIS(/IS/ISIL/who-cares-what-they-call-themselves-they’re-nuts). While many, including Mr. Wolfgang, point to the speech as a turning point in the Obama administration away from isolationism, it in fact continues the Obama White House foreign policy that has been in place since he took office: namely, Pres. Obama’s policy of small- to medium-scale military intervention by another name.

Whether you call it “police action,” “counterterrorism,” “targeted airstrikes,” or any of the other Obama administration euphemisms, this White House has pursued interventionist tactics in almost every global hotspot where it has encountered national security threats. The supposed difference from the George W. Bush administration has been the absence of “boots on the ground,” despite the fact that there will now be nearly 2,000 American “advisors” and who-knows-how-many special operations and CIA agents in Iraq. While large-scale military operations such as the Bush-era wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been wound down, the United States is far from an isolationist nation.

Rewriting History in the Middle East: The Yazidis [No Longer] in Iraq

State borders in the Middle East have been in flux for millennia, with the strongest ruler of the day vying for control over fertile land, trade routes, and major water sources. Today, the region is populated with many countries whose modern-day borders were arbitrarily delineated by the British-French Sykes-Picot Agreement, whose peoples have been in a constant struggle to reclaim what they believe is rightfully their land. Much of a state’s validity comes from being able to show that they have the oldest claim to the region, so what happens when a people’s physical life, when their physical history is deleted?

What happens when a city is blown to smithereens by explosive charges, as with mosques and churches in Mosul, instead of falling to salvageable ruins? What happens when an entire people is removed from their ancestral homeland, fleeing to a neighboring country, leaving no trace of their existence in the former land? Or, in the grand scheme of political and strategic interests, is the individual human story irrelevant?

The Road Back to Baghdad Part 3: The Reckoning

Early this morning US time, two 500-pound, laser-guided bombs were dropped by US forces on Islamic State (IS) targets outside of Erbil, Iraq. Overnight, the Obama administration shifted its policy of non-military intervention in the ever-expanding conflict with the Islamic State, citing both humanitarian and strategic concerns. Since June 2014, Islamic State has made several alarming advances in Iraq and Syria, claiming major cities such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul, and re-engaging Syrian government and rebel forces across the border.

Islamic State positions. Courtesy NY Times.

The capture of key territory in both countries has reinforced the extremist group’s financial and military resources, and in IS strongholds, a strict form of Islamic law is being enforced. The US airstrikes come on the heels of the displacement of tens of thousands of Yazidi Iraqis, whose religion has been deemed “devil worship” by IS and who were warned to “convert or die.” In his statement last night, US Pres. Barack Obama indicated that the decision to expand humanitarian and military aid was based on fears that “acts of genocide” may soon be carried out against Iraqi Yazidis, approximately 40,000 of whom are trapped without food or water on Sinjar Mountain in Kurdish Iraq.

Part 2: From Anbar to Aleppo and Back Again

The most recent violence in Iraq did not appear suddenly, as if from nowhere. It’s been brewing since the US troop withdrawal in 2011, and was established during the US occupation, as discussed in Part I of this essay series. The insurgency’s fires have been flamed by the civil war that has been raging in Syria for roughly the same period of time. The conflict’s regional extension is the topic of Part 2 of my essay series on the increasingly likely Iraqi civil war.

Part 2: From Anbar to Aleppo and Back Again

ISIS may have been born in Iraq, but it came of age in Syria. Founded in 2003 as a branch of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) dedicated to combatting the US occupation of Iraq, the Islamic State in Iraq was one of many AQI-led terrorist groups that carried out attacks against both foreign forces and the newly elected Iraqi government of Nouri Al-Maliki during the civil war of 2006-2007. The group has long operated out of Al-Anbar province, while receiving aid and fighters from Syrian provinces across the border, where tribal connections run deeper than national boundaries. Despite a lull in attacks during the US surge, ISI operations began to ramp up as troop withdrawals began in 2009. The civilian death toll in Iraq has only continued to climb and each year reaches new, morbid heights:

And then came Syria. Already the launching ground and regrouping point for ISI attacks in Iraq, the rapid disintegration of government power in Syria provided the perfect vacuum for the group to step in and claim to join those fighting for freedom. At the same time as the final US troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, Syria was descending into a civil war that would eventually act as a magnet for extremist groups including ISI, all of whom wanted a piece of the post-war spoils. The Islamic State in Iraq quickly transformed into the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (or “and Syria,” or “and the Levant”) to denote its expanded mission, and has now declared its name as simply “Islamic State,” indicating its goal of creating a caliphate that spans the Muslim world. In July 2012, ISI declared the “Breaking of the Walls” campaign, which culminated with over 500 militants freed in a prison break from the infamous Abu Ghraib outside Baghdad in July 2013. It broke off from Al Qaeda in January 2014, when arguments among the leadership over tactics and strategy apparently caused an irreparable rift.

Part One: The Road Back to Baghdad

Three years after the American withdrawal from Iraq, the broken country we left behind has reared its ugly head and threatens to descend into sectarian civil war. In many ways, the United States is reaping the seeds it sowed in the manner of its exit from Iraq as well as our nearly total non-involvement in Syria’s civil war next door. The road back to Baghdad has been coming for the US ever since we withdrew from the country in 2011 (and, arguable, ever since we waged an uncoordinated mess of an invasion and occupation in 2003). 

Part one of this essay delves into what many have taken to calling “The Iraq We Left Behind,” and possible US strategies to address some of these issues. Part two will discuss the interconnected Syrian conflict’s ramifications in Iraq, and address the question of whether or not Iraq (or any of Syria’s neighbors) will find stability if civil war continues to rage next door. Part three will discuss the US opportunities to eek some good out of this international and regional disaster, especially with longtime adversary Iran.

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 Part One: The Road Back to Baghdad

Central in the story of Iraq’s re-descent into civil war (if, arguably, it ever left it), Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki looms as both villain and longtime partner. Allegedly selected for the Prime Minister post in a shadowy dealing between a CIA officer and the US Ambassador in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, Maliki went from being a relatively unknown but zealous activist in the pro-Shi’ite movement to Prime Minister of Iraq in three months’ time in 2006. Having fled Iraq after his political activities on behalf of the Shi’ite Dawa Party (now his political party) threatened to get him killed, Maliki directed anti-Saddam operations from abroad until the US invaded in 2003. According to Khalilzad in an article by Dexter Filkins, the US only exerted its influence in Iraq to help the election come to the result it wanted. Although American officials had been assured Maliki was "independent" from Iran, it became apparent that he was closer to the Islamic Republic than informants had admitted, and it is now rumored he was hand-picked by the Iranian Al Quds commander Qassem Suleimani. Yet from sideline supporter, America's relationship with Maliki grew in the coming years until the US openly supported Maliki in the subsequent 2010 elections against his secular opponent, Ayad Allawi.

Obama’s Foreign Policy (or “Lack Thereof”?)

My colleague Colin Wolfgang recently addressed the perceived shortcomings in Pres. Obama’s foreign policy, many of which speak to legitimate concerns. He suggests that the Obama administrations failures on foreign policy have not come from policy itself, but a lack of clear vision for America’s position in world affairs. Yet in doing so, he uttered a telling phrase about Obama’s “inability to project American dominance on the rest of the world in the same way his predecessors have done before him.” This history of American power projection and its detrimental effect on America’s credibility, coupled with the changing nature of the global balance of power, have resulted in the Obama administration’s current perceived inability to negotiate a better position for the United States. The administration’s policies, however, reflect both the wishes of the American citizenry and a new paradigm in international relations, one that places primacy not on power but on peace, not on the winning of wars but the avoidance of war by other means.

Pres. Obama riding a velociraptor. Because reasons.

 As he took office in January 2009, Pres. Obama was faced with a global financial crisis largely brought on by the policies of prior administrations, two unpopular and unsuccessful wars in the Middle East, and an increasing threat of Islamic extremism throughout the world. Despite these obstacles, for many observers Pres. Obama’s first term was a success in terms of his foreign policy initiatives, and foreign policy was considered one of his strengths vis-à-vis Mitt Romney in the 2012 election. He oversaw the final withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, established a timeline to wind down the Afghan war, attempted to close down Guantanamo Bay, and pursued a policy of limited drone warfare against terrorist groups. As his second term dawned, however, increasing political violence in Iraq clouded the success of troop withdrawal, a political stalemate with the Afghan government hindered the creation of a comprehensive transition plan, Guantanamo remained open (and still does), and the policy of drone warfare came under fire as the civilians affected by drones as well as drone operators spoke out about the program’s human costs.

No Way Out: The Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Regional Host Countries

Just under a year ago, when the number of Syrian refugees had just topped a million people, the conflict had already caused the largest refugee diaspora and humanitarian disaster of the decade. Over the last year, the crisis has grown exponentially, and there are now more than 2.3 million registered refugees according to the UNHCR. There could be as many as three million when unregistered refugees are taken into account. In 2013, more than 1.7 million refugees were registered by the UNHCR, 3.4 times the amount that registered the year before. The UNHCR has thus requested $4.2 billion in additional funding to assist it and more than 100 other agencies as they deliver life-saving aid to refugees both in camps and out, as well as to their host communities.

Refugee camp in Iraqi Kurdistan. Courtesy PressTV.

The UN’s Regional Response Plan (or RRP), now in its sixth revision, focuses on responding to two key areas of aid delivery: essential needs and services, and protection. Essential needs and services range from food security, shelter, health and nutrition, education, water, sanitation and hygiene, and livelihoods. Of particular concern are the 30% of refugee children not vaccinated against measles and polio, leading to the resurgence of polio within Syria, and fears of an outbreak in the region. Additionally, most of if not all of the refugees have experienced trauma of some kind, and psychosocial health care must be provided if they are ever to recover. The UN highlights education as a key concern, amid fears that the Syrian refugee children will become a “Lost Generation” after having witnessed horrific acts and spending years out of the classroom.  Basic access to shelter has been an issue in every host country, and 420,000 refugees in the region live in “tented, non-permanent accommodations,” while 105,000 live in “substandard informal settlements.”

Will Diplomacy Really Save the Middle East?

Two weeks ago, President Obama was carefully weighing his options for a U.S. response to allegations that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons on civilians – options that included a unilateral military strike. In a world where these days, many countries choose to impress influence on others militarily, a military strike was certainly not out of the realm of realistic and understandable possibilities. However, the past week has demonstrated that countries can still work together, and get things done, without military force. Between the Syrian chemical weapons deal and the latest developments in Iran, President Obama has averted the political mess of a military strike and has new hope for peaceful negotiations in the Middle East.

I will be the first to admit that at the news of Russia’s diplomatic proposal for Syria to surrender their chemical weapons, I was extremely skeptical. The feasibility of actually destroying the weapons seemed not to have been considered, and Russia’s track record with cooperation did not reinforce any confidence in their ability to execute the plan successfully. And while I still have my reservations, things have moved forward as they were supposed to. Syria is documenting their chemical stockpiles, and once this assessment has been made, the next steps will be securing and eventually destroying them.

Meanwhile in Iran, the recently elected Prime Minister Hassan Rouhani has seemed more open to nuclear negotiations with the United States than his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ever was. After years upon years of crippling sanctions imposed upon Iran not only by the U.S. but much of the Western world, perhaps this has simply been a long time coming. However, as my colleague Vicky pointed out, Prime Minister Rouhani and President Obama are the most politically aligned counterparts in the Iran-U.S. relationship in at least 20 years. Political incompatibility cannot foster cooperation, and it’s important to keep this in mind as Iran and the U.S. move forward in hopefully assuaging our nuclear fears once and for all while preserving Iran’s dignity and allowing nuclear energy creation in some capacity.

Diplomacy hinges on trust, though – something that the U.S. more or less lacks entirely when it comes to Syria and Iran. There is certainly reason to remain leery of these processes as they continue to unfold over the next several weeks and months. However, for the time being, this is a victory for Obama and a monumental indication to the rest of the world that diplomacy is not obsolete.

The Truth Behind Russia's Proposal on Syria

The world breathed a collective sigh of relief after President Obama's speech last night, a speech in which Obama indicated that a vote from Congress on military force in Syria would be put on hold while we once again revisited the idea of diplomacy. In fact, it's safe to say President Obama himself was breathing a sigh of relief, having averted what would have been a dramatic failure when Congress undoubtedly voted against authorizing military force. Instead, the world's attention has been turned towards Russia, who days ago unveiled their proposal for seizure of Syrian chemical weapons by the international community in place of any military action. True, this alternative satisfies the international community's need to stand up against chemical weapons and show that there are repercussions to their use, and also avoids dragging any other country's army into the conflict - nobody will argue that these are the main stipulations for any proposal put on the negotiating table. However, the proposal is nothing more than a vapid, empty attempt by Russia and Syria to delay any international reaction of substance. President Obama may have successfully avoided an embarrassing defeat by Congress of his authority to use military force, but the time for that will ultimately come when the veil has been lifted and Russia's proposal is seen for what it really is.

Bread over Bombs: Why the US Should Not Strike Syria

Over the last week, The Global Atlas’s metaphorical lights have been off as the three lead contributors were either out of town, dealing with Allston Christmas, and starting the new school year and the flood of students and work that comes with it. In that week, Pres. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have raised the decibel level on the rhetoric surrounding the Syria crisis. Both have confirmed their belief that a chemical attack took place in late August, possibly followed by another; both have pointed the finger at Syrian President Bashar al-Asad; and both have hinted that military strikes will begin soon, but only with congressional approval. The likelihood of a strike increased this morning with the State Dept. ordering all of its non-emergency personnel out of Beirut, and issuing travel warnings for Turkey and Lebanon.

I’ve been pretty vocal in my criticism of the handling of the Syrian crisis, and I’m not about to change now: bombing Asad’s forces would be a huge mistake. It could have the allegedly unintended effect of toppling Asad; it could also very well prevent the use of chemical weapons by either side or others in the future, which of course is a desirable outcome. Yet its other effects would be so negative and detrimental to finding a sustainable peace in Syria that they would vastly outweigh any positives that could result from such a strike. As I have written before, the time for a military intervention has long passed, and toppling Asad without a negotiated settlement in place leaves us with unsavory choices for his replacement.

Syria’s Chemical War

The videos are heart-wrenching to watch: a young boy, screaming and crying with other children in the street while bodies lie around them. A young man convulses uncontrollably, while others are sprawled in the halls of what appears to be an overwhelmed medical clinic; some still shake and show signs of life, others are clearly dead. In what has become a hallmark of videos of massacres in Syria, makeshift morgues lined with scores of corpses leave no doubt that a massive attack has taken place. The surviving victims display many of the hallmark symptoms of sarin gas exposure: convulsions, foaming at the mouth, and dilated pupils, and the scale of the casualties only add weight to this conjecture.

Videos of the attack today in the Ghouta region east of Damascus killing hundreds of civilians will test the United States’ ability to stay out of the two-year-old civil war in Syria. Opposition leaders have already pointed their fingers at beleaguered president and war criminal Bashar al-Asad. US Pres. Barack Obama has previously listed chemical attacks as a “red line” that, if crossed, would automatically trigger American intervention. Yet despite confirming that it had “conclusive evidence” of such an attack in June, the government has yet to deliver the promised military aid to rebel groups. The amount of footage from today’s alleged attack makes it difficult to dispute that something horrific has taken place in Ghouta, yet there is little reason to believe a Western response will go much further than rhetoric and promises of aid.

The Asad regime denies that such an attack took place – and if it did, the government insists that it was at the hands of the opposition. There is, for once, good reason to be suspicious of the attack: it took place just a few miles from where the United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is staying in Damascus, after having arrived in Syria on Sunday. It seems counterintuitive that Asad would order an attack on a location that can be so easily and immediately accessed by UN inspectors, especially so soon after their arrival. The Asad regime has also been winning important battles using conventional methods, and there seems to be no good strategic reason that it would shift tactics now. In the chemical weapons attacks earlier this summer, evidence pointed not only to the regime’s use of sarin, but also to likely rebel use against government forces. Both groups claim the other is trying to frame them, and both may be right. If this is the case in Ghouta, then rebel groups murdered hundreds of their own supporters in order to gain Western support in the seemingly never-ending war against Asad, an unthinkable action.

A man lays an infant to rest among scores of victims. Courtesy AP.

Then again, the Asad regime could be growing increasingly confident that even if the UN team confirms the use of sarin, Western governments will still stay out of the Syrian civil war. Asad is many things, but an idiot isn’t one of them; he can sense as well as anyone else American and European reluctance to get involved in what would be a messy intervention, at a cost of billions of dollars to their already unbalanced budgets, not to mention on the side of rebels who may or may not end up supporting Western interests if they were to gain power. After all, the “conclusive evidence” of the sarin attacks earlier this summer cited by the American government has failed to provoke even the delivery of military aid, let alone boots on the ground.

The UN teams must answer questions of who is culpable for the attacks swiftly if there is to be hope of outside intervention. The conflict has already caused human suffering at a pace and scale that is unprecedented in regional history: over 100,000 have died in the civil war, and more than half of Syria’s population has been displaced both internally and abroad. The addition of chemical weapons will devastate an already shattered country, and lessen the likelihood of a peaceful transition when the dust clears. In the worst case scenario, chemical weapons alongside conventional warfare will render the country Syria a barren failed state, with stronghold controlled by warlords where massacres and human rights violations regularly take place. In the best, a timely intervention by outside forces to establish No-Fly Zones and safe havens for civilians while assisting the rebels to win militarily or force the regime to the negotiating table would at least leave Syria intact as a country. At this point in the conflict, that’s the best we can hope for, and that is nearly as depressing as the West’s lack of intervention for the last two years.

What the Heck is Going on in Iraq?

In the 19 months since the Obama Administration effectively removed the last of the U.S. troops in Iraq, the embattled state has seen slight progress – something virtually unparalleled since Saddam Hussein was taken out of power in 2003. Due to enormous, and previously unforeseen deposits of oil underneath Kurdish territory in the north and northeast regions of the country, Iraqi Kurds have had more leverage in dealing and negotiating with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite government – in fact, this past June marked the first time al-Maliki had visited Iraqi Kurdistan in over two years. On the other hand, sectarian violence, especially between the Sunnis and the Shiites, has remained incredibly high. For his part, al-Maliki has “encouraged talks”, but with a promise to continue military assaults against Sunnis he perceives as threatening, these talks are likely not to happen anytime soon. However, there certainly remains an air of increasing stability in the country – an air that has not existed in quite some time.

Does the G8 Still Matter?

The G8 summit, taking place this week in Northern Ireland, represents a yearly gathering of 8 of the world’s 11 most wealthy countries. Every year, world leaders from the Group of 8 meet to discuss primarily the global economy, but also pressing topics such as terrorism, world food supply, and this year, the Syrian conflict. Representing 50.1 percent of the world’s total GDP, there is no question that these eight countries hold more sway than most. Yet in the face of deep divisions between members such as Russia and the US, as well as the absence of China, India, and Brazil, does the G8 truly still have relevance in today’s world?

Why the World Needs a Bully: Syria and the Hegemonic Stability Theory

By Guest-Writer Paul Mitchell

Like it or not, the United Nations and the “international community” which it purportedly represents, is allowing the death of a country and endangering the stability – if we can call it that – of the entire Middle East.  Whether you want to call the situation in Syria a mere crisis, a revolution, a revolt, or a rebellion, a reported death toll of over 70,000 people can be called nothing other than an atrocity.  The brutality is magnified by the fact that one side is using military aircraft, armor, and weaponry, and is fighting a civilian force that had been largely disarmed over years of oppressive rule.  With recent reports that chemical weapons have been used, and with a US President that had implicitly drawn a line in the sand regarding the use of such weapons, something has to be done, right?  Unfortunately, with a US President who, like former President Bill Clinton, believes whole-heartedly in the merits and capabilities of the United Nations, the answer is no.

Where have all the good guys gone? How the West lost Syria

Events have not been kind to the Syrian rebels of late. Bashar al-Asad’s* victories in Damascus and its environs and suspected use of chemical weapons were the first blows. The arms shipment from Russia, Lebanon’s Hezbollah declaring outright military assistance to the regime, and the continued refusal of the West to provide meaningful aid have almost certainly spelled an end to the rebels’ hopes of military victory. Even the lifting of an E.U. embargo on arms to Syria does not mean that the arms will be forthcoming any time soon. The looming question remains: even if we wanted to support the rebellion with arms, who exactly would we give them to?

Sen. John McCain pays a surprise visit to Syrian rebels this week. Too bad for them he didn't bring any guns.

Certainly not Jabhat al-Nusra, the Al-Qaeda affiliate that has emerged as a power player on the rebel side. Despite their odious ideology, the Nusra Front has proved a great asset to the rebels, assisting greatly in the battle for Aleppo. Any rebel victory would mean that the group would have a say in Syria’s future, and if their positions thus far give any indication, most Syrians – who have traditionally been one of the most secular societies in the Middle East – would not like it. Aside from Jabhat Al-Nusra, a proliferation of other extremist Islamist groups have taken control of towns throughout Syria, as indicated in this Crisis Group report. They, too, have had enough military successes now that the Islamist share in a new government would be quite large.

What about the Syrian opposition’s leader, Gen. Salim Idris? Could we funnel the weapons through him? This, too, proves a challenging proposition. The West would have no way of knowing who the weapons were going to, especially given the shifting loyalties of rebel fighters on the ground to one faction or another. As the bloody conflict drags on, more and more fighters are being radicalized or simply want to join the strongest side, and that has been the Islamist groups. As discussed above, these groups are also intrinsically linked to the rest of the Free Syrian Army. If the West were to provide arms to the Free Syrian Army, it would have to accept that these groups are part and parcel of that movement, and that one day we could regret our decision to arm anti-American militias. Think Afghanistan, but in the dead center of the Middle East, right across the border from Iraq.

If Western leaders find it too risky to provide arms, the only two options left are to intervene with our own militaries, or let the Syrians fight it out and continue attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. The first option is not on the table. In fact, it’s so far off the table it’s down the street hiding in the neighbor’s house hoping to never be brought to the table. The second seems to be the most likely policy pursued by the West, said or unsaid. The rebels have already said they will boycott upcoming peace talks in Geneva, although Asad has committed to attending. It appears that they either still have hope of Western assistance, or the violence has been to such a degree that reaching an agreement with a man who slaughtered thousands of his own people is to onerous to imagine. It is an understandable sentiment, but at the same time a negotiated settlement might be the best option left for the opposition. It would guarantee them a place in a new government, and perhaps even offer the option of an exit by Asad. Otherwise, there is no telling how many more lives will be lost, how many more people will be displaced, and how much of a ruin Syria will be when the dust and blood settle.

The aftermath of a recent government massacre in Bayda. 

The sick irony of Lebanon interfering in Syria’s conflict less than a decade after the Syrian government pulled out of its own thirty-year-long occupation of Lebanon should be lost on no one. Syria is becoming Lebanon circa 1975-1990. This is a good and bad thing: despite a protracted civil conflict that dragged out for decades and spilled over into its neighbors, Lebanon’s civil war did not cause the region to implode. Yet the degree of spillover is might higher in the Syrian conflict. Lebanon’s civil war generated a million refugees in 15 years. Syria reached that number in two. Its potential to ignite a region that has already experienced so many upheavals in the last decade is much greater than that of Lebanon.

As I write this article, I hate the words I have to say. I loathe Bashar al-Asad. Any human being that is capable of the crimes he has committed deserves to be in a very, very small cell for the rest of his days. I wanted the rebels to win militarily from the outset of the conflict. If the West had acted a year ago, six months ago even, that could still be an option. But the hard truth is, there are no more good guys in this conflict. The rebel side has committed atrocities of its own and has increasingly been taken over by radicals and extremists. The “good guys” lost this civil war a long, long time ago. It’s not an answer than anyone wants, but the West and especially the United States chose it. We chose it by not acting. We chose it by not helping. Now we have to live with it; that, and the blood of nearly a hundred thousand Syrian people on our already very unclean hands. Unfortunately, the only outcome of this civil war appears to be the maintenance in power of a dictator, a proliferation of extremism, and millions of Syrians whose lives have unalterably changed for the worse. Faced with these facts, I can’t help but ask, what was it all for?

*Since I’ve been getting a lot of comments on this spelling, I believe I owe the readers an explanation. In Arabic, Assad indicates an actual doubling of the “s” sound, marked by a symbol known as a “shadda.” There is no “shadda” on Asad’s name, meaning that it is pronounced without the doubling of the “s.” Therefore, the proper transliteration is “Asad” with one “s.” BOOM four years of Arabic! Now you can go forth with that knowledge and feel superior about it.