Three years after the American withdrawal from Iraq, the
broken country we left behind has reared its ugly head and threatens to descend
into sectarian civil war. In many ways, the United States is reaping the seeds it
sowed in the manner of its exit from Iraq as well as our nearly total
non-involvement in Syria’s civil war next door. The road back to Baghdad has
been coming for the US ever since we withdrew from the country in 2011 (and,
arguable, ever since we waged an uncoordinated mess of an invasion and
occupation in 2003).
Part one of this essay delves into what many have taken to
calling “The Iraq We Left Behind,” and possible US strategies to address some
of these issues. Part two will discuss the interconnected Syrian conflict’s
ramifications in Iraq, and address the question of whether or not Iraq (or any
of Syria’s neighbors) will find stability if civil war continues to rage next
door. Part three will discuss the US opportunities to eek some good out of this international and regional disaster, especially with longtime adversary Iran.
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Central in the story of Iraq’s re-descent into civil war
(if, arguably, it ever left it), Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki looms as both
villain and longtime partner. Allegedly
selected for the Prime Minister post in a shadowy dealing between a CIA officer
and the US Ambassador in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, Maliki went from being a
relatively unknown but zealous activist in the pro-Shi’ite movement to Prime
Minister of Iraq in three months’ time in 2006. Having fled Iraq after his political
activities on behalf of the Shi’ite Dawa Party (now his political party)
threatened to get him killed, Maliki directed anti-Saddam operations from
abroad until the US invaded in 2003. According to Khalilzad
in an article by Dexter Filkins, the US only exerted its influence in Iraq to
help the election come to the result it wanted. Although American officials had been assured Maliki was "independent" from Iran, it became apparent that he was closer to the Islamic Republic than informants had admitted, and it is now rumored he was hand-picked by the Iranian Al Quds commander Qassem Suleimani. Yet from sideline supporter,
America's relationship with Maliki grew in the coming years until the US openly supported Maliki
in the subsequent 2010 elections against his secular opponent, Ayad Allawi.
Yet Maliki was not so beloved by all of his people. He had acted as many democratically elected leaders who are autocrats at heart are wont to do: he consolidated his power not by building broad partnerships and working to create consensus among parties and regions, but by extending his grip to every security apparatus within the Iraqi government; he stocked ministries and the military with allies and purged Sunnis from important positions; he favored Shi'ite areas and neglected Sunni (and not to mention Kurdish) ones; and, perhaps worst of all, he let loose a fireball of repression in the face of all those who would seek to disagree with them. Arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions, coupled with an enfeebled and dependent judiciary, became the law of the land.
Despite these warning signs, post-Iraq planning
in the last years of the Bush administration and during Obama’s first term was
focused less on the democratic prospects for Iraq’s future, and more with
securing the relationship with Maliki, since he now controlled both armed forces
and government and we would need all of his resources to allow for a
less-than-disastrous withdrawal in 2011. While at the time, American ground
forces had stifled the bloodshed that had welled up in the aftermath of the
2006-2007 civil war, their withdrawal under such circumstances was predicted by
many to simply set the scene for another conflict. And many have been proved
right over the last few weeks and days as 300 American military advisers and
Secretary of State John Kerry head to Baghdad.
The Road Back?
Yet rather than lamenting the woeful mistake of initial
invasion, the subsequent mishandling of the occupation, and the poorly planned
(or rather, misguided) withdrawal in 2011, none of which policymakers can now
take back, how does America act in the face of another Iraqi civil war? A civil
war that, if lost, could at best lead to the world’s newest failed state and at
worst provide a safe-haven for extremist groups?
Many are disheartened by the political field the US must
work with, both in the Iraqi government and in the opposition; after all, if we
cannot find partners, how do we act? As Ned Parker points out in a prescient,
now-haunting April 2012 Foreign Affairs article
titled “The Iraq We Left Behind: Welcome to the World’s Next Failed State”:
"All of
Iraq's political leaders seem to live by the maxim that no enemy can become a
partner, just a temporary ally; betrayal lurks around every corner…Maliki's
opponents, including his secular rival Ayad Allawi, the head of the Iraqiya
Party, have given no indication they would act any differently.
It is better to ask: if all the leaders are likely to act
much as Maliki did, what safeguards can be put into place to keep them in
check? A negotiated political agreement between not only Iraq’s political
leaders but also its tribal ones would by necessity need to include at minimum:
more checks on the power of the executive branch, institutionalized
power-sharing, electoral rules that make diverse coalition governments
necessary, consensus-building institutions and ministries with meritocratic
hiring and promotion practices, a reformed and independent judiciary, and, very
likely, a federalized system of governance of Iraq’s provinces. Without these
safeguards, even if the Iraqi and US forces (if America chooses limited
intervention, but more on that next time) succeed and Maliki is replaced with another opponent, the
practices of Iraq’s fledgling democracy – those of corruption, violence, and
repression – are unlikely to change.
A limited military intervention, not only in Iraq but in
neighboring Syria, cannot be successful without the engagement and willingness
to compromise of Iraq’s political factions – full stop. As observed
by the prolific (and oft-maligned) Middle East expert Thomas Friedman:
Finally, while none of the main
actors in Iraq, other than Kurds, are fighting for our values, is anyone there
even fighting for our interests: a minimally stable Iraq that doesn't threaten
us? And whom we can realistically help?
The answers still aren't clear to
me, and, until they are, I'd be very wary about intervening.
Without guarantees of “no victor, no vanquish” reached by
all sides, according to Friedman, the same tribal, regional, and sectarian
divisions will only wait to rear their ugly heads once again, in what would be
a continual rather than momentary conflict. The warning again rings true: Iraq
could be the world’s next Somalia.
Yet if such agreements are reached by Iraq’s political (and
regional, tribal, and religious leaders), they will likely do so by first
ousting Prime Minister Maliki. He seems to have lost even US support, with
Pres. Obama hinting in a statement
yesterday that Maliki should step down as he announced a US contingent of 300 military
advisors to assist the beleaguered Iraqi government. Maliki lost another
crucial supporter from within the Shi’ite community when Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani seemingly disavowed his government and called for a more “effective”
one today.
At the present moment, Pres. Obama and Sec. Kerry appear to
be pursuing just these strategies. They are also likely keeping the military on
full alert in case more intervention is agreed upon and, presumably, approved
by Congress. It is impossible to know what is going on behind closed doors, however, and whether or not Sec. Kerry is pursuing a consensus-centric, governance-focused settlement will not be apparent for some time. In the coming days, we will all wait and see if Obama’s strategies
can overcome Maliki’s intransigence and desire to hold on to power, as well as
bring key players to the negotiation table. None will wait with more baited
breath than the Iraqi people.
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We hate to say we told you so.... who are we kidding, we love being so damn right all the time:
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We hate to say we told you so.... who are we kidding, we love being so damn right all the time:
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