Intense fighting
between ISIS and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters over the past month for control of
the strategic city of Kobani on the Turkish-Syrian border threatens not only
domestic stability within Turkey, but also the peace process between the
Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Kobani poses a
strategic threat as its capture by ISIS would put the terrorist group in full
control of the area from Raqqa, Syria to the Turkish border, a span of more
than 60 miles/100 kilometers. Worse, the geography of the region here is rather
flat, and there are legitimate concerns that control of Kobani would lead to
surrounding cantons and ultimately to control of the entire 1200 km
Turkish-Syrian border. Airstrikes by the United States, Saudi Arabia and the
UAE against ISIS to the south, southeast and southwest of Kobani succeeded in
destroying multiple armed vehicles, including one carrying anti-aircraft
artillery, a tank and an ISIS unit. According to the State Department, these
airstrikes are aimed at disrupting ISIS command and control, as well as
destroying the group’s infrastructure and sources of fuel and financing.
On
Monday, Turkey made an abrupt and significant policy shift, announcing that it
would allow passage by land for Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to travel from
northern Iraq through Turkish territory to northern Syria to provide much
needed reinforcements of ground troops to Kurdish fighters in Kobani. US and
allied airstrikes around Kobani have been successful in stemming the aggressive
gains of ISIS, but have also effectively cut off ground routes to the city. The
shift in Turkish policy may allow for an influx of ground troops, which,
combined with the weapons supplies and medicines airdropped into Kobani by the
US military, will be needed to prevent ISIS from capturing Kobani.
This change is
significant in the context of Turkey’s rocky history with its Kurdish
population and the PKK. Thus far, Turkey had resisted assisting Kurdish
Democratic Union Party (PYD) fighters in Kobani due to PYD’s links to PKK. Ethnic
Kurds, who comprise approximately 20% of the Turkish population, have historically
been marginalized and persecuted within their home country. The PKK launched its
insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984, demanding an independent
Kurdistan incorporating the Kurdish regions of not only Turkey, but also Iraq,
Syria, and Iran. Over the past thirty years, the majority of the violence
occurred in southeastern Turkey, leading to the deaths of more than 30,000
people and the demolition of hundreds of Kurdish villages.
In the past
decade, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pushed for peace talks with
the PKK, and the group has ceased its call for an independent Kurdistan,
instead pushing for greater autonomy, and cultural and linguistic rights within
Turkey. Despite this progress, as recently as a month ago, Erdogan openly
equated the Kurdish PYD fighters with ISIS fighters, referring to both parties
as terrorists. Peace talks have been further jeopardized by Turkey’s
non-interference stance in the Kurdish fight against ISIS in Kobani, with
Kurdish politicians expressing frustration with the Turkish government for
failing to arm Kurdish fighters, effectively accusing the government of
supporting ISIS through inaction.
Until now, Turkey’s
non-interference stance seemed to be the best move for the central government to
avoid sparking sectarian unrest or violence within the country. Most of the
fault lines that lead to violence in the Middle East exist within Turkey: the
political divide between Islamists and non-Islamists, the ethnic divide between
the Kurds and Turks, and the sectarian divide Sunni-non-Sunni populations. However,
recent events spell the end of the non-interference policy, as deadly clashes
between ethnic Kurds and Islamist groups, nationalist groups, and Turkish
police erupted in various Turkish cities.
Indeed, while
there have been many pro-Kurdish rallies and protests within Turkey, there is support
for ISIS as well within Turkey’s Muslim majority population: according to the
International Crisis Group, while there is condemnation for the brutal methods
employed by ISIS, there is sympathy for its cause. Hundreds of Turks are
rumored to have joined ISIS’s ranks, and propaganda materials calling for jihad
have begun circulating at universities, including one university in Istanbul.
Turkey faces the
challenging task of maintaining its fragile relationship with the PKK, quelling
the violent sectarian clashes within its borders, and preventing ISIS from
encroaching across Turkish borders. Turkey cannot stand against ISIS alone and
will have to find a way to reconcile animosity or distrust of the PYD troops in
order to support regional and international stakeholders in the existing
anti-ISIS coalition. Should Kobani fall to ISIS control, it would almost
definitively spell the end of the peace process and ensure increased violent
protests within the country. Only one thing is certain: the time for Turkey’s
policy of non-interference has come to an abrupt and indisputable end.
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