The Ones the World Forgot: The Syrian Refugee Crisis

The following is an adaptation of a presentation I gave on April 12, 2014 at the Boston Consortium for Arab Region Studies conference:

Since last writing on this topic in February, the news emanating from the Syrian refugee crisis has only gotten worse. There are now close to 2.7 million refugees who have fled the Syrian conflict, the majority of whom have settled in Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. There are almost 14 million people who are in need of aid in the region as a result of the conflict, and funds from the international community have hardly been forthcoming: the UNHCR’s appeal for 4.2 billion dollars is only 14% funded, while UNICEF’s 222 million dollar appeal is less than 12% funded. Without these desperately needed resources, UN agencies as well as over one hundred other humanitarian agencies can do little to mitigate the devastating effects of the Syrian conflict on the region.

The effects of the crisis on Syria’s neighbors are becoming more acute, and more violent. In Lebanon, clashes not only in the north of the country but also in Beirut have led to scores of casualties and deaths. A Syrian refugee mother recently set herself on fire in front of a UN building in Tripoli because she was unable to feed her four children on the small amount that aid agencies and the government are currently struggling to provide. Lebanon also passed the “devastating milestone” of one million Syrian refugees this month, and refugees now make up a quarter of the population, the largest per capita concentration of refugees in the world.

Where have all the good guys gone? How the West lost Syria

Events have not been kind to the Syrian rebels of late. Bashar al-Asad’s* victories in Damascus and its environs and suspected use of chemical weapons were the first blows. The arms shipment from Russia, Lebanon’s Hezbollah declaring outright military assistance to the regime, and the continued refusal of the West to provide meaningful aid have almost certainly spelled an end to the rebels’ hopes of military victory. Even the lifting of an E.U. embargo on arms to Syria does not mean that the arms will be forthcoming any time soon. The looming question remains: even if we wanted to support the rebellion with arms, who exactly would we give them to?

Sen. John McCain pays a surprise visit to Syrian rebels this week. Too bad for them he didn't bring any guns.

Certainly not Jabhat al-Nusra, the Al-Qaeda affiliate that has emerged as a power player on the rebel side. Despite their odious ideology, the Nusra Front has proved a great asset to the rebels, assisting greatly in the battle for Aleppo. Any rebel victory would mean that the group would have a say in Syria’s future, and if their positions thus far give any indication, most Syrians – who have traditionally been one of the most secular societies in the Middle East – would not like it. Aside from Jabhat Al-Nusra, a proliferation of other extremist Islamist groups have taken control of towns throughout Syria, as indicated in this Crisis Group report. They, too, have had enough military successes now that the Islamist share in a new government would be quite large.

What about the Syrian opposition’s leader, Gen. Salim Idris? Could we funnel the weapons through him? This, too, proves a challenging proposition. The West would have no way of knowing who the weapons were going to, especially given the shifting loyalties of rebel fighters on the ground to one faction or another. As the bloody conflict drags on, more and more fighters are being radicalized or simply want to join the strongest side, and that has been the Islamist groups. As discussed above, these groups are also intrinsically linked to the rest of the Free Syrian Army. If the West were to provide arms to the Free Syrian Army, it would have to accept that these groups are part and parcel of that movement, and that one day we could regret our decision to arm anti-American militias. Think Afghanistan, but in the dead center of the Middle East, right across the border from Iraq.

If Western leaders find it too risky to provide arms, the only two options left are to intervene with our own militaries, or let the Syrians fight it out and continue attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. The first option is not on the table. In fact, it’s so far off the table it’s down the street hiding in the neighbor’s house hoping to never be brought to the table. The second seems to be the most likely policy pursued by the West, said or unsaid. The rebels have already said they will boycott upcoming peace talks in Geneva, although Asad has committed to attending. It appears that they either still have hope of Western assistance, or the violence has been to such a degree that reaching an agreement with a man who slaughtered thousands of his own people is to onerous to imagine. It is an understandable sentiment, but at the same time a negotiated settlement might be the best option left for the opposition. It would guarantee them a place in a new government, and perhaps even offer the option of an exit by Asad. Otherwise, there is no telling how many more lives will be lost, how many more people will be displaced, and how much of a ruin Syria will be when the dust and blood settle.

The aftermath of a recent government massacre in Bayda. 

The sick irony of Lebanon interfering in Syria’s conflict less than a decade after the Syrian government pulled out of its own thirty-year-long occupation of Lebanon should be lost on no one. Syria is becoming Lebanon circa 1975-1990. This is a good and bad thing: despite a protracted civil conflict that dragged out for decades and spilled over into its neighbors, Lebanon’s civil war did not cause the region to implode. Yet the degree of spillover is might higher in the Syrian conflict. Lebanon’s civil war generated a million refugees in 15 years. Syria reached that number in two. Its potential to ignite a region that has already experienced so many upheavals in the last decade is much greater than that of Lebanon.

As I write this article, I hate the words I have to say. I loathe Bashar al-Asad. Any human being that is capable of the crimes he has committed deserves to be in a very, very small cell for the rest of his days. I wanted the rebels to win militarily from the outset of the conflict. If the West had acted a year ago, six months ago even, that could still be an option. But the hard truth is, there are no more good guys in this conflict. The rebel side has committed atrocities of its own and has increasingly been taken over by radicals and extremists. The “good guys” lost this civil war a long, long time ago. It’s not an answer than anyone wants, but the West and especially the United States chose it. We chose it by not acting. We chose it by not helping. Now we have to live with it; that, and the blood of nearly a hundred thousand Syrian people on our already very unclean hands. Unfortunately, the only outcome of this civil war appears to be the maintenance in power of a dictator, a proliferation of extremism, and millions of Syrians whose lives have unalterably changed for the worse. Faced with these facts, I can’t help but ask, what was it all for?

*Since I’ve been getting a lot of comments on this spelling, I believe I owe the readers an explanation. In Arabic, Assad indicates an actual doubling of the “s” sound, marked by a symbol known as a “shadda.” There is no “shadda” on Asad’s name, meaning that it is pronounced without the doubling of the “s.” Therefore, the proper transliteration is “Asad” with one “s.” BOOM four years of Arabic! Now you can go forth with that knowledge and feel superior about it.

Hezbollah's Fatal Mistake?

Israel’s headline-grabbing airstrike on a Syrian convoy garnered much attention this week, with some asking if this signaled a greater external presence in the ongoing conflict. It distinctly does not, since Israel’s main target is not in fact Bashar al-Asad’s government, but rather Hezbollah in Lebanon. The strike this week did, however, shine a light on the degree to which the Lebanese political party and militant wing have become embroiled in the Syrian conflict next door, as well as highlight the precarious position Hezbollah finds itself in as a result of its pro-Asad position.

Hezbollah supporters rally with both Hezbollah flags and pro-government Syrian flags (courtesy Bilal Hussein / AP)

In other Arab countries, a Pew research poll in June 2012 found an overwhelming percentage of residents from all religious backgrounds support the fall of the Asad regime. In Lebanon, a delicate sectarian balance coupled with complicated ties to Syria and Asad has resulted in a more nuanced picture. While overall 53 percent of Lebanese supported the Asad stepping down, when broken down by sect, 67 percent of Christians and 80 percent of Sunnis supported the fall of the regime, while only 3 percent of Shias said they supported the end of Asad’s rule. Additionally, 96 percent of Lebanese Shias had “favorable” views of Asad. This support goes beyond religion and is deeply rooted in Shia Alawite-dominated Syria’s historical support for Lebanon’s Shia population, which is much larger proportionally than in other Levantine countries.

Hezbollah has supported Asad since the beginning of Syria’s civil war more than two years ago, but due to popular condemnation of the regime it attempted to distance itself from direct actions to aid the Syrian government. Elected officials in the political branch of Hezbollah advocated for a policy of “dissociation” with Asad’s government to appease the large numbers of Lebanese who denounce his regime and the atrocities being visited upon the Syrian population. Yet rumors of Hezbollah’s militant fighters being filtered into Syria are no longer just rumor: just this Tuesday, the Syrian opposition “reported that rebels had killed 15 Hezbollah fighters in Qusair[1].” In summer 2012, reports surfaced of a group of 5,000 Hezbollah fighters being sent to Syria, earning the approbation of Lebanese and international observers alike.

Hezbollah-backed Shi'ite Lebanese fighters cross into Syria (courtesy Bilal Hussein / AP)

Israel’s recent airstrike on a convoy of Syrian weapons supposedly heading for Hezbollah therefore does not reflect a political will for deeper involvement in the deadly conflict, but a sincere fear of the direct arming of Hezbollah with Syria’s arsenal, including chemical and biological weapons. While Israel cannot stop the Syrian conflict nor keep Hezbollah from supplying it with fighters, it can prevent weapons from flowing freely to Lebanon and raising the likelihood of not only another Israeli-Lebanese war, but also an Israeli-Syrian one.

This (barely) covert support for Asad has had serious political consequences for Hezbollah domestically. Lebanon had been ruled by a March 8 coalition made up of Hezbollah and several other parties, in opposition to the Sunni and Christian-led March 14 movement. Prime Miniter Najib Mikati resigned from the government in March, citing the ongoing domestic crisis in Lebanon that has resulted from the Syria conflict as one of the primary reasons behind his decision to step down. Violence has rocked the country over the last two years as pro- and anti-Asad Lebanese as well as Syrian refugees and migrants engage in street battles, especially in northern Lebanon where the civil war’s effects are particularly acute.

Daddy's boy: Bashar al-Asad pictured with Hassan Nasrallah and his father, Hafez al-Asad (courtesy REUTERS/Ali Hashisho)

While Israel’s airstrike and involvement in any Arab war will be controversial and play on pre-existing anti-Israel sentiments in the region, reactions are not nearly negative enough to counter the bad publicity Hezbollah is suffering at home and abroad for its support of Asad’s regime. The leader of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah remains loyal to the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria axis that has served his party well for years. As the Syrian civil war drags on with no end in sight, however, he may find that his once incredibly popular group made a losing gamble both in the Arab world and in Lebanon itself. One can only hope that any Hezbollah-led government would realize its error before civil war returns to Lebanon.

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[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/world/middleeast/hezbollah-takes-risks-by-fighting-rebels-in-syria.html?hp&_r=1&

Syria is Burning: The Devastating Effects of Nonintervention

I have a Syrian friend named Ahmed, a kind and friendly owner of a local cafe in Allston. As I'm grabbing my morning coffee, Ahmed and I talk politics often as he knows my interest in international relations focuses mainly on the Middle East. In our four years of friendship, he's offered some of the most astute and accurate observations of Middle Eastern politics I've ever heard. I remember a conversation we had early last summer that began as most of our conversations do, with me asking how his family still in Syria was doing. With his characteristic smile and cheerful demeanor, he dismissed my concerns. "They all live in Aleppo," he said. "The regime could never afford to touch Aleppo. That's where all of the rich and powerful people live."

Aleppo in October 2012.

Fast-forward eight months to today and much of Aleppo is a burned out shell, reflecting the desperate situation across all of Syria. Since the end of the Eid al-Adha “ceasefire” in late October, fighting has ramped up along with casualties, compounded by a harsh winter faced by civilians who have in many cases lost everything. In a conflict that has left at least 70,000 people dead, 2 million internally displaced, and 700,000 refugees, the frontlines have stagnated throughout much of the country, leading to fears of a drawn out and devastating war of attrition. Since the uprising began in March 2011, Western governments have contented themselves with tentative UN moves handily blocked by Russia and China. Regional powers support whichever side serves their interests, and competing factions within Syria’s neighbors oftentimes arm both.